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In a Chapter 11 reorganization, senior creditors are entitled to insist 
upon being paid in full before anyone junior to them receives anything. 
In practice, however, departures from such “absolute priority” are 
commonplace. Explaining these deviations has been a central preoccu-
pation of reorganization scholars for decades. By the standard law-and-
economics account, deviations from absolute priority arise because 
well-positioned insiders take advantage of cumbersome procedures and 
inept judges. In this paper, we suggest that a far simpler and more be-
nign force dominates bargaining in reorganization cases.  
“Deviations” from absolute priority are inevitable even in a world 
completely committed to respecting priority as long as asset values are 
uncertain. Uncertainty accompanies any valuation procedure. Bargain-
ing in corporate reorganizations takes place in the shadow of this uncer-
tainty, and standard models of litigation and settlement show that valua-
tion uncertainty alone can explain many of the departures from absolute 
priority we see in large corporate reorganizations.  Even where rational 
and well-informed senior investors expect the absolute priority rule to 
be strictly enforced, they must account for the uncertainty associated 
with any valuation. The possibility of an unexpectedly high appraisal 
will cause them to offer apparently out-of-the-money junior investors 
contingent interests in the reorganized business.  
The debate over absolute priority, the central principle of modern 
corporate reorganization law, has been misdirected for decades. It has 
failed to recognize that a substantive rule of absolute priority does not 
lead to an absolute priority outcome. A coherent account of absolute 
priority must incorporate relative priority. It must take account of the 
option value implicit in the junior investors’ right to insist on an ap-
praisal.   
 
This paper offers an explanation for one of the most important and 
persistent puzzles in corporate reorganizations. In a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion, senior creditors are, in principle, entitled to insist upon “absolute pri-
ority.” They have a right to be paid in full before junior investors receive 
anything. This “fixed principle” has been the foundation of our corporate 
reorganization laws for decades.1 In practice, however, departures from ab-
                                                 
1 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod., 308 U.S. 106, 116 (1939) (“This doctrine is the 
‘fixed principle’ according to which Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd [228 U.S. 482 (1913)] 
decided the character of reorganization plans was to be evaluated.”). 
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solute priority are commonplace.2 Senior creditors regularly allow those jun-
ior to them to participate in recoveries even when the senior creditors may 
not be paid in full. Explaining this gap between law and practice has been a 
central preoccupation of reorganization scholars since the 1920s. 
To most observers, these persistent “deviations” from absolute priority 
suggest something is seriously amiss. Conventional accounts, particularly in 
the law-and-economics literature, are replete with finger pointing. Bank-
ruptcy judges are biased or incompetent or in any event powerless to pro-
tect the priority of senior investors. Old managers, the representatives of 
the shareholders, “use their power to run their businesses and to control 
reorganization agendas to capture portions of the value that creditors are 
legally entitled to receive.”3 This account, however accurate it may have 
once been, utterly fails to capture the dynamics of corporate reorganiza-
tions today. 
The typical modern bankruptcy judge is committed to respecting legal 
priorities and does not hesitate to entertain a sale of the business as an al-
ternative to reorganizing.4 She is far less likely to allow junior investors to 
play for time or otherwise manipulate the process. Old managers frequently 
are replaced (often before the Chapter 11 case even begins) with turn-
around specialists whose bias, if any, is with the senior investors. Old eq-
uityholders, far from controlling the process, typically are wiped out. The 
contest is between seasoned investors (banks, hedge funds and other insti-
tutional investors) who hold debt at different levels of the debtor’s capital 
structure, none of whom enjoys special sympathy from the judge or anyone 
else.  
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority 
Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457, 1468 (1990) (finding departures in 76% of 
cases); Julian R. Franks & Walter Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorgani-
zation, 44 J. FIN. 747, 754, 768 (1989); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution, 27 J. FIN. 
ECON. 285, 286 (1990) (finding departures from absolute priority in 78% of the cases). 
One can posit situations (often involving small businesses in which the owner-managers 
have private information) in which parties bargain for something other than absolute pri-
ority. One can also posit situations (again typically involving small businesses) in which it is 
not meaningful to talk about an ex ante bargain among all the participants. Such cases, 
however, are not the norm in the large reorganizations that are the focal point of academic 
debates either in the 1930s or today. 
3 Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 
1836 n.69 (1998). 
4 In 2002, 56% of the large Chapter 11 reorganizations resulted in a sale of one sort or 
another. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 673, 675 (2003). 
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The Chapter 11 proceedings of Conseco Corporation offer a good ex-
ample of how the standard account fails to capture modern reorganization 
practice. Conseco, one of the largest Chapter 11 debtors ever, was a suc-
cessful insurance holding company that purchased, for many billions of dol-
lars, a financer of mobile homes. The mobile home business turned out to 
be worth only a fraction of what Conseco paid for it, and Conseco, after 
having been successful for so long, proved insolvent. Conseco’s founder (as 
well as his replacement) was fired before the Chapter 11 case even began. 
The negotiations were between senior banks and bondholders. Equity 
holders did not play any material role.5 Neither creditor group had informa-
tion the other did not. Neither had any special power over the business or 
how its affairs were run.  
Conseco’s senior bank debt amounted to approximately $2.04 billion.6 
In the bargaining that ensued, the senior banks agreed to accept notes for 
$1.3 billion and callable, convertible preferred stock for the balance of their 
claims.7 The junior bondholders received substantially all of the common 
stock of the reorganized company.8 At the time of these negotiations, the 
                                                 
5 An official committee representing holders of “trust preferred” securities that were 
junior to Conseco’s bondholders did object to confirmation of the plan embodying the 
settlement ultimately reached between Conseco’s banks and the bondholders. This objec-
tion forced the bankruptcy court to hold a valuation trial at which the committee sought to 
establish that the value of the business was high enough so the trust preferred securities 
were “in the money.” The lengthy confirmation hearing was completed, but before the 
court ruled, the banks and bondholders settled with the trust preferred holders, offering 
them a small amount of value, mostly in the form of warrants with a strike price in the 
money only at high enterprise values. Conseco, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 
(Dec. 31, 2003). This post-trial settlement with the holders of Conseco’s trust preferred 
securities is illustrative of the theme of this paper. It was, in effect, the price the banks and 
bondholders were willing to pay for an insurance policy against the possibility of an unex-
pectedly high valuation.  
6 Conseco’s senior bank debt consisted of approximately $1.54 billion of outstanding 
loans under a syndicated bank credit agreement and approximately $500 million associated 
with Conseco’s guarantees of bank borrowings by officers and directors, including in each 
case unpaid interest through the date on which the chapter 11 proceedings commenced..  
Conseco, Inc., Second Amended Disclosure Statement for Reorganizing Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reor-
ganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of The United States Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 02-49672 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Second Amended Disclosure Statement] at 18-19. 
7  Second Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at Exhibit 2.2; Conseco, Inc., supra 
note 5, at 102. 
8 Id. 
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press suggested Conseco was not worth enough to pay the banks in full.9 
By the standard law-and-economics account, a well-functioning reorganiza-
tion process in such circumstances would have left junior investors with 
little or no distributions under a plan of reorganization. In this light, the 
distributions received by Conseco’s junior bondholders seem highly sus-
pect. They appear to represent a “deviation” from absolute priority that the 
conventional model would attribute to the junior bondholders’ ability to 
delay or otherwise manipulate the reorganization process.  
Conseco’s junior bondholders, however, did not have any real ability to 
delay or manipulate the process. They could not do so because, to protect 
policy holders, insurance regulators were ready to appoint receivers for 
Conseco’s insurance subsidiaries if the companies were not speedily re-
structured.10  The appointment of receivers would have meant the profit-
able insurance subsidiaries would cease to write new policies and would liq-
uidate. The going concern value of the enterprise in excess of its liquidation 
value would have been lost.11 This left little opportunity for junior investors 
to delay the day of reckoning.    
Conseco is but an extreme example of what is increasingly common in 
large corporate reorganizations. In most cases, there is a high likelihood 
that some form of liquidation of the business (usually a going-concern sale) 
will be imposed on junior creditors if a reasonably prompt reorganization 
cannot be accomplished.12 Yet, sophisticated senior investors, facing an im-
partial bankruptcy judge who holds a tight leash on the process, regularly 
agree to plans of reorganization that provide for distributions to apparently 
out-of-the-money junior investors, typically in the form of a residual stub 
of equity or warrants.13  
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Floyd Norris & Joseph B. Treaster, Conseco’s Troubles Outlast Reign of a Would-
Be Savior, N.Y. TIMES, October 4, 2002, at C5 (quoting an analyst who said, “We don’t 
think the company can be liquidated for even $2 billion”).    
10 Conseco, Inc., supra note 5, at 76. 
11 For this reason, among others, scorched earth delaying tactics on the part of Con-
seco’s junior bondholders would have destroyed any prospect of a recovery for them. In-
deed, even if a liquidation could have been avoided, a protracted restructuring would have 
prolonged the period during which the insurance subsidiaries would have continued with-
out restoration of a strong A.M. Best rating. The absence of such a rating would have 
made it impossible to continue in some policy lines and would have impaired others. The 
value of the business would have been substantially reduced. 
12 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 675. 
13 Warrants are a common feature of securities issued in large Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions. See Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 403, 431. Recent cases include Exide Technologies, Lodgian, U.S. Airways, 
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If these outcomes are not driven by junior investors’ control of the 
process, as the standard account would have it, something else must be at 
work. We believe the standard account ignores something that is quite im-
portant, very simple and essentially benign. Applying the absolute priority 
rule in the context of a corporate reorganization requires the enterprise to 
be valued. Uncertainties accompany any valuation procedure. These uncer-
tainties affect bargaining over reorganization distributions in ways that can 
be readily predicted from the standard models of litigation and settlement, 
and drive negotiated outcomes in many large corporate reorganization 
cases.14  
In this paper, we show that the uncertainty inherent in valuing a large 
corporation in financial distress creates a bargaining dynamic that accounts 
for many of the “puzzling” departures from absolute priority that cannot be 
explained by the standard model.15 “Deviations” from absolute priority are 
                                                                                                                       
Pillowtex, Weblink Wireless, Sun HealthCare Group, and Factory Card Outlet Corp. See 
EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES, EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES ANNOUNCES FIRST QUARTER OF FISCAL 
2005 EARNINGS RESULTS, Aug. 12. 2004, 
http://www.exideworld.com/News/pressrelease/financial/20040812_1qfy05_earnings_re
sults.html;  Disclosure Statement for Joint Plan of Reorganization of Lodgian, Inc., et al. 
(other than the CCA Debtors), together with the Official Committee of Unsecured Credi-
tors under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, dated as of September 5, 2002, at 25-27; 
First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of US Airways Group, Inc. and Its Affiliated 
Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession, dated January 17, 2003, at Exhibit L; Disclosure 
Statement with Respect to First amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of US Airways 
Group, Inc. and its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession, dated January 17, 2003, 
at 54-55; Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code for the 
Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Pillowtex Corporation and its Debtor 
Subsidiaries, March 6, 2002, at 67-68; Second Amended Plan of Reorganization of We-
bLink Wireless, Inc., Pagemart PCS, Inc., and Pagemart II, Inc. under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, dated July 15, 2002, at Exhibit G; In re Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 
Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization, dated Dec. 18, 2001, at 
24-25; and In re Factory Card Outlet Corp., and Factory Card Outlet of America LTD., 
Debtors’ Joint Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
dated Feb. 5, 2002, at 36. 
14 The reorganization of Loral is a typical recent example. A leading satellite commu-
nications company had some assets that could be (and were sold) for more than a billion 
dollars. However, there was not a liquid market for the remaining assets (which included 
everything from orbital slots to real estate to disputes with insurers to unfulfilled contracts 
to launch new satellites). Valuation of Loral’s assets accordingly became the single issue 
coloring the entire case. See, e.g., Loral Skynet CEO Details Post-Chapter 11, SATELLITE 
NEWS, Oct. 4, 2004; John Russell, Loral Shareholders Want Investigation; They Claim Bankrupt 
Firm Is Not Insolvent, AKRON BEACON J., Aug. 8, 2004, at D1; Lou Whiteman, Intelset Wins 
Loral Satellite Auction, DAILY DEAL, Oct. 21, 2003. 
15 When possible, of course, we want to avoid such valuation problems by using mar-
kets to establish value. Modern bankruptcy practice in fact frequently takes advantage of 
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in fact nothing of the kind. They are rather the natural product of bargain-
ing in a world that is completely committed to respecting priority but in 
which values are uncertain. Critics of Chapter 11 have assumed that a sub-
stantive right to enjoy absolute priority should lead to outcomes that also 
reflect absolute priority. This is a mistake. Those participating in the mod-
ern debate over corporate reorganizations took the wrong path because 
they have insisted on seeing something—an absolute priority outcome—
that should not be there in the first place. Ironically, while the academy has 
neglected the way in which valuation uncertainty affects the dynamics of 
bargaining in Chapter 11, practitioners have long identified it as the princi-
pal challenge to resolving corporate reorganizations.16 
In Part I of this paper, we review the absolute priority rule and the 
standard explanations for “deviations” from it offered in the law and eco-
nomics literature. We suggest why these explanations fail to completely ac-
count for the outcomes we see in the reorganization of large, publicly 
traded, businesses. In Part II, we describe the context in which a large busi-
ness typically is reorganized in Chapter 11 today. In Part III, we lay out the 
bargaining dynamics created by valuation uncertainty and explain how 
those dynamics account for many of the “deviations” from absolute prior-
ity commonly seen in large reorganization cases. In Part IV, we discuss the 
implications of our analysis for the form of the negotiated outcomes we see 
in reorganization cases. In Part V, we conclude by connecting our observa-
tions to the longstanding debate in corporate reorganization law over the 
optimal distribution rule — the choice between relative and absolute prior-
ity—a debate joined by two legal scholars, James Bonbright and Milton 
Bergerman, in 192817 and which has been raging ever since. 
 
                                                                                                                       
markets. More than half of the large businesses that enter Chapter 11 go through an asset 
sale rather than a reorganization. In recent years, these have included, to name a few, En-
ron, Fruit of the Loom, TWA, Budget Rent-A-Car, and Global Crossing. See In re Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 2001 WL 1820326, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001); Baird & Ras-
mussen, supra note 4, at 676-77, 681-82 & n.31, 698 & n.68. The cases that are left are pre-
cisely those where the market is illiquid or, as discussed further below, where the debtor’s 
stakeholders believe the market does not attribute adequate value to the business. In such 
circumstances, investors as a group are better off foregoing a market sale until after the 
reorganization is over. Conseco and Worldcom (renamed MCI) provide recent illustrations 
of such cases.  See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text; Ken Belson & Matt Richtel, 
Qwest Quits Bid for MCI as Verizon Raises Offer, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2005, at C5.  
16 See, e.g., Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 301, 314 (1982). 
17 See generally James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority 
Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928). 
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I.  
Absolute Priority in Theory and in Practice 
A single engine drives law-and-economics accounts of corporate reor-
ganization. The reorganization of an insolvent enterprise is the equivalent 
of a going concern sale of the business to its creditors in exchange for their 
claims.18 The business has an uncertain future. It is like a lottery ticket be-
fore a drawing.19 While there is a chance that it may do well, there is also a 
chance that it will do poorly. At the time this “lottery ticket” is “sold,” it 
must be valued for purposes of allocating interests in it among its new 
owners (the creditors).20 This valuation necessarily collapses all future pos-
sibilities to a present value, and, absent agreement of the requisite majorities 
of each impaired class of creditors, the valuation dictates how interests in 
the reorganized enterprise must be allocated to satisfy the absolute priority 
rule.   
Assume that the debtor’s business will be worth $200 or $100 in a year’s 
time with equal probability. The senior investor is owed $160 and the junior 
investor $40. At a going concern sale, the senior investor should, in theory, 
be able to sell the business for $150 (less a discount for the time value of 
money), the amount that reflects both the probability that the business will 
do well and that it will fail. Because the senior investor is owed $160, its 
priority should entitle it to the entire $150 generated in the sale. Hence, it 
should receive the value of the entire business in any plan of reorganization 
that respects the absolute priority rule.  
Some law-and-economics accounts of “deviations” from absolute prior-
ity focus on private information and firm-specific human capital. These 
models, however, are not relevant here. Departures from absolute priority 
can be justified if junior investors run the business and possess private in-
formation or firm-specific human capital.21 In such circumstances, a portion 
                                                 
18 THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, 210-213 
(1986).  
19 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 474 
(1992). In other work, however, Adler is quick to identify the bargaining dynamics that are 
our central concern here. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INSTI-
TUTE L. REV. 219, 226−29 (2004). 
20 Among themselves, the “purchasers” relative entitlements are established by their 
ex ante bargain, as reflected in their nonbankruptcy entitlements rights against the debtor.  
21 See, e.g., Paul Povel, Optimal ‘Soft’ or ‘Tough’ Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J.L ECON. & 
ORG. 659 (1999); Robert Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy and the Allocation of 
Control 12–13 (1992) (unpublished manuscript); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Randal C. 
Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital 2-3 (Univer-
sity of Chicago, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 16, 2d Series, 
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of the value of the business may be inextricably linked to the participation 
of the junior investors.22 In the case of smaller businesses, the junior inves-
tors, who may well be the managers of the firm, often possess just such 
characteristics. Allowing them to participate in reorganization distributions, 
even if, as investors, they are “out of the money” as a matter of strict legal 
priority, often is a price senior investors are willing to pay to ensure their 
cooperation. Such a justification does not, however, typically apply to larger 
companies. The managers are professions who can be and are frequently 
replaced, sometimes even before the Chapter 11 case is filed and equity-
holders commonly are wiped out.23 Moreover, pre-bankruptcy boards of 
directors, sooner or later, are replaced.24  
Restructuring negotiations in Chapter 11 cases today take place primar-
ily between senior and junior creditors, none of whom has participated in 
running the business. Trading of claims in advance of Chapter 11 or shortly 
afterwards typically ensures that these groups consist of seasoned profes-
sionals who specialize in recapitalizing distressed businesses.25 In connec-
tion with the reorganization process, these parties learn more about the 
business than the outside world knows, but neither has an informational 
advantage vis á vis the other.26 Models that depend upon private informa-
tion or firm-specific human capital to explain departures from absolute pri-
ority thus have no role to play. 
To explain deviations from absolute priority in the absence of private 
information or firm-specific human capital, the standard account posits that 
                                                                                                                       
1993), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_01-25/16.Bebchuk-
Picker.pdf. 
22 See Bebchuk & Picker, supra note 21, at 2-3. 
23 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 692 n.65. 
24 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corpo-
rate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2006). 
25 Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable 
Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 181 (2004) 
(noting that “distressed debt trading has grown to proportions never contemplated at the 
time of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act”); Glenn E. Siegel, Introduction: ABI 
Guide to Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: Part 2 ABI Committee on Public Companies and Trading 
Claims, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177, 177 (2003) (“Perhaps nothing has changed the 
face of bankruptcy in the last decade as much as the newfound liquidity in claims. . . . 
Now, in almost every size case, there is an opportunity for creditors to exit the bankruptcy 
in exchange for a payment from a distressed debt trader . . ..”). See generally Paul M. Gold-
schmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191 (2005).  
26 See infra note 77. 
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the Chapter 11 process itself is defective. It permits junior creditors to in-
terfere with the senior creditors’ right to insist on an accurate valuation. If 
junior investors are aware that an accurate valuation—one that reflects 
what a sale in the marketplace will yield—will afford them little or no re-
covery, they will seek to put off the day of reckoning. If they can delay a 
sale (or any other accurate valuation mechanism), they have a chance of 
recovery. Returning to the metaphor of the lottery ticket, they would prefer 
to play the odds rather than value the ticket based on probable outcomes. 
If, after some time passes, the lottery ticket proves a loser, they still receive 
nothing. But if it proves a winner, there will be $200 to be divided. After 
the senior investors receive the $160 they are owed, there is still enough to 
make distributions to junior investors.  
The ability of junior investors to postpone the day of reckoning gives 
them bargaining power by imposing transaction and opportunity costs on 
senior investors and by preserving the possibility that the lottery ticket may 
prove to be a winner before the allocation of distributions is decided. If 
junior investors have the power to delay, it should lead to plans of reor-
ganizations that deviate from absolute priority. Senior creditors will agree to 
accept less than their apparent legal entitlements because of the costs delay 
would impose upon them and because of the option value junior investors 
have as a result of their ability to delay. 
There are a number of ways junior investors may seek to delay the day 
of reckoning and increase their chance of being paid. They can seek to 
cause the debtor to delay introduction of a plan of reorganization while the 
court maintains the debtor’s exclusive period to file a plan.27 They can seek 
to use the resources of the debtor to finance an attack (however remote the 
likelihood of success) on the priority position of the senior investors.28 
They can seek to prevent other steps, such as a shutdown of the business or 
an asset sale, that will monetize the value of the business.29 In addition, be-
cause it involves no cost to them, they can seek to cause the debtor to de-
                                                 
27 For Chapter 11 cases commencing after October 17, 2005, the availability of such 
extensions has been limited to 18 months following the petition date by recent amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code. S. Res. 256, 109th Cong. (2005) (to be codified at 11 
U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)).  
28 See Arturo Bris et al., Who Should Pay for Bankruptcy Costs? 2-4 (Yale Law School, 
Center for Law, Economics, and Public Policy Research Paper No. 277, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=401300. 
29 See JACKSON, supra note 18, at 216 (“Any event that fixes value today, such as a sale 
of assets . . . leaves [shareholders] with nothing as their baseline entitlement. When a group 
has nothing to lose by delay, that group will in fact favor delay.”).  
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ploy its capital on speculative ventures to generate value.30 To the extent 
these tactics are successful, the senior investors bear the costs of delay (in 
terms of both expense and opportunity cost) while the junior investors reap 
the benefits.    
By this account, senior investors have difficulty defeating junior inves-
tors’ delaying tactics because the debtor’s managers often cooperate with 
the junior investors, making it difficult for the senior investors to force a 
sale or some other process that values the assets accurately. Bankruptcy 
courts are thought complicit in these tactics because of their historical ten-
dency to grant repeated extensions of the debtor’s exclusive period to file a 
plan.31 Moreover, once a plan is filed, and even though an unbiased valua-
tion at market would give senior investors the entire business, bankruptcy 
judges, it is said, resist markets and mechanisms that mimic them, often 
adopting a peculiarly rosy view of the world. “Reorganization value” is not 
construed as what the enterprise would fetch in the marketplace, but the 
value of the enterprise if things turn out as hoped. The lottery ticket, in 
other words, tends to be valued closer to $200, its value if it proved a win-
ner, rather than $150, the value accurately reflecting both the upside and 
the downside.32 
                                                 
30 See Adler, supra note 19, at 448 (“If equity can control the firm, moreover, it can in-
crease the risk of the debtor's investments....”).  
31 See James J. White, Harvey’s Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467, 474 (1995) (“[T]he larg-
est and most palpable costs of Chapter 11 arise from delay. . . . Chapter 11—at least as 
practiced in large cases—appears to condone and even exaggerate delay and the attendant 
costs. For example, Eastern Airlines lost $600 million during the twenty-two months it 
lingered in Chapter 11. LTV continued in bankruptcy from July, 1986, to May, 1993, and 
during most of that time incurred losses. Countless other smaller and nameless Chapter 
11’s—as many as ninety percent—have this attribute; namely, they are businesses that 
must ultimately be liquidated, but it takes as long as eighteen months on average to ac-
complish liquidation. And during every one of those 550 days in bankruptcy, many, per-
haps most, of these firms are experiencing losses and postponing the day when their assets 
can be allocated to better and more efficient purposes. The costs of delay are palpable and 
indisputable.”). 
32 Some argue that the result in the recent Exide Technologies case, In re Exide Tech-
nologies, 303 Bankr. 48 (D. Del. 2003), supports this proposition. The judge valued the 
business in a way that imputed a value of $24.50 per share to the new equity when the 
business emerged in Spring 2004 and the equity is now trading for less than $5. See, e.g., 
O’Rourke, supra note 13, at 406. The stock, however, traded close to the judicial valuation 
at first. In any event, our principal claim is not that bankruptcy judges are necessarily as 
good as unbiased experts, only that valuation variance is a persistent and pervasive prob-
lem that any theory of absolute priority must take into account. If we relax the assumption 
that bankruptcy judges have financial expertise equivalent to an expert appraiser and also 
recognize that the expert ‘hired gun” testimony presented to the court by opposing liti-
gants is likely itself to be biased toward the extreme ends of the range of variance, it can be 
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In short, the standard law-and-economics model of corporate reorgani-
zations rests, to a very large extent, on the assumption that out-of-the-
money junior investors retain excessive influence over the Chapter 11 proc-
ess. Bankruptcy judges give lip service to the dictates of absolute priority, 
but they lack the discipline, the training, or the inclination to rein in junior 
investors and value assets accurately and expeditiously. To be sure, the sen-
ior and junior investors can reach a deal with each other to prevent the 
needless dissipation of assets. Nevertheless, these “deviations” from abso-
lute priority are still costly. A world in which absolute priority is not re-
spected is one in which entrepreneurs will have less access to capital. Pro-
spective investors take the dynamics of Chapter 11 into account and either 
refuse to lend or demand higher rates of interest. Some projects with a 
positive expected value will not be funded.33 
 If the standard model captures what is going on in large Chapter 11 re-
organizations, a number of reforms seem sensible. For example, procedures 
could be imposed that ensure a swift day of reckoning, such as an immedi-
ate sale in the market or a process that forces junior investors to buy out 
the seniors as a condition of maintaining their interests.34 At a minimum, 
provisions should be added to Chapter 11 that force plan negotiations to 
conclusion at an earlier date.35    
The standard model, however, cannot be squared with modern Chapter 
11 practice in large cases. Contrary to the assumption that junior investors 
hold the levers of power, senior investors are increasingly successful at in-
sisting upon a relatively speedy day of reckoning. Assets sales are common-
place. We see them in more than half the cases, and they are the benchmark 
against which consensual plans are measured in the rest.36 Where the busi-
ness is not sold, many Chapter 11 cases involve prepackaged or pre-
negotiated reorganization plans where junior investors’ delaying tactics are 
not a serious factor, and even when values are disputed and a bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                       
expected that the variance associated with judicial appraisals will be larger than that associ-
ated with the appraisal of an independent expert. A certain fraction of the time this will 
lead to outcomes at the extreme ends of the variance range without any systematic bias on 
the part of the judiciary. See infra note 86. 
33 See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1814 (1998). 
34 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 523, 524, 532-36 (1992). See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corpo-
rate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988).   
35 This was part of the rationale for the recent Bankruptcy Code amendments limiting 
extensions of the debtor’s exclusive period to file a plan. See supra note 27.  
36 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 679. 
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judge is called upon to value the debtor’s business, there is less systematic 
bias today than the traditional account suggests.37  
A crucial element of the bargaining dynamic has been overlooked. The 
valuation problem in a reorganization case is crucially different from the 
one associated with valuing a lottery ticket. While there is no way to know 
whether a lottery ticket will prove a winner, the probabilities and the pay-
offs are known and agreed upon by all parties. Given the relevant informa-
tion, risk-neutral investors will place the same value on the lottery ticket. 
Collapsing future possibilities to present value yields a sum certain. Valuing 
a business, on the other hand, is not as simple as valuing a lottery ticket. 
Unlike a lottery ticket with known probabilities and payoffs, when it comes 
to valuing a business, well informed and equally sophisticated parties can 
have different perspectives regarding the likelihood of different value out-
comes. For example, two equally sophisticated investment bankers can be 
in honest disagreement over the value of a business. Differences of ten or 
twenty percent are commonplace.38 This range of valuation perspectives is 
the dominant feature of the problem we face in valuing a business, espe-
cially a business in economic distress.  
A market transaction (sale) resolves such differences in valuation per-
spective by rewarding the highest bidder with ownership of the asset. It is 
highest bidder’s perspective that counts. In the absence of a market transac-
tion in a reorganization case, however, it is the bankruptcy judge’s perspec-
tive—and how senior and junior investors perceive it—that counts. Their 
potentially very different assessments of the judge’s ultimate valuation 
drives bargaining behavior. For this reason, starting with the equivalent of a 
lottery ticket to model corporate reorganizations—as virtually all of the law 
and economics literature does in one way or another—is seriously incom-
plete. Such models assume that differences in valuation perspectives can 
safely be ignored, that they do not affect the dynamics of Chapter 11 reor-
ganizations in an important way. They cannot be. Disparities in investors’ 
views over how to value the enterprise and in their views of how the judge 
will value it drive much of the bargaining in large reorganization cases and 
                                                 
37 Our model allows for the parties to assess valuation bias in determining probabili-
ties of various value outcomes. To the extent such bias remains and is affecting settle-
ments, reforms might well be warranted.  
38 As Fischer Black famously observed, “All estimates of value are noisy.” See Fischer 
Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986). Indeed, Black showed that without such valuation 
uncertainty, securities markets could not even exist. For him, a market was efficient if the 
price at which a security traded is somewhere between half and twice its true value. Id. For 
an example of a reorganization case in which the problem of valuation is discussed exten-
sively, see In re Exide Technologies, 303 Bankr. 48, 70-71 (D. Del. 2003). 
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account for many of the departures we see from absolute priority. Such 
disparities also explain why the bargains ultimately struck between senior 
and junior investors (providing for a payout to junior investors that has 
value only if the business does well) take the form that they do. 
 Once the impact of the uncertainties associated with appraising the 
value of the enterprise are recognized, reforms that seek to ensure closer 
adherence to the absolute priority rule appear less urgent. Apparent depar-
tures from absolute priority can be seen as inevitable features of negotia-
tions conducted in the shadow of the absolute priority rule because, in the 
context of a reorganization, the rule itself must rely for its enforcement on 
non-market based valuation mechanisms. One can press for greater use of 
markets, but there is little evidence that Chapter 11, as currently practiced 
in large cases, fails to make sufficient use of markets: if creditors desire to 
reorganize the enterprise rather than sell, they have concluded the enter-
prise is worth more to them than the market will bring. From this perspec-
tive it would appear that many, if not most, so-called “deviations” from ab-
solute priority—the most often-voiced weakness of Chapter 11—are 
greatly overstated, if not illusory.  
 
II.  
Two Chapter 11 Prototypes: Sale or Reorganization 
Several distinct patterns mark modern large business reorganization 
practice. The major divide is between those cases in which there is a sale of 
the business (or its assets) to a third party and those in which the business 
is reorganized, with existing investors becoming the owners of reorganized 
enterprise.39 Where the business is sold to a third party, outcomes are, to a 
very large extent, consistent with absolute priority as traditionally under-
stood. Where the business is reorganized, the right to insist on a judicial 
valuation in connection with enforcement of the absolute priority rule is a 
prominent feature of the bargaining dynamic. It is here that bargained-for 
deviations from absolute priority most often appear and must be accounted 
for. We examine each of these prototypes in turn. 
                                                 
39 As others have observed, as with a sale, a reorganization is nothing more than a 
change of control transaction—a sale of the business to the creditors. See, e.g., Robert C. 
Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1250-54 (1981). Under 
this view, the majority voting provisions of Chapter 11 might be considered the share-
holder governance provisions of an acquisition vehicle called the debtor-in-possession. By 
permitting the majority of each class of creditors to bind the majority, the provisions of 
Chapter 11 solve a collective action problem within the acquiring (creditor) group. For the 
classic exposition of reorganization law as a solution to a collective action problem, see 
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE 
L.J. 857, 860-65 (1982).  
16 / Absolute Priority & Valuation Uncertainty 
Sale of the Distressed Business in Chapter 11 
Sales of operating businesses in Chapter 11 are commonplace. This is 
true even in very large Chapter 11 cases—cases involving businesses that, in 
a prior era, were thought to be too large to be readily sold. A Chapter 11 
sale can take a number of different forms and the timing can vary. Some-
times, as in the case of U.S. Office Products, negotiation of the sale of the 
debtor’s core businesses (its office products business and its Mailboxes, Etc. 
subsidiary) is largely completed before the commencement of Chapter 11 
proceedings. In such cases, sales are consummated within weeks of the 
company’s Chapter 11 filing. In other cases, like that of Bethlehem Steel, 
the business may remain in Chapter 11 for an extended period before being 
sold.40 
A sale of the troubled business or its assets is often the only logical 
course. This is especially so when the debtor’s operations are losing money, 
even before debt service.41 Consider Qualitech Steel.42 Qualitech Steel was 
formed in 1996 to exploit new technologies for producing specialty steels. 
Its two plants cost more than $400 million. They took longer to build and 
were more costly to construct and operate than expected, and generally per-
formed below expectations. When it entered Chapter 11, Qualitech owed 
secured lenders about $265 million and it was losing $10 million a month.43 
Everyone recognized from the outset that the plants had to be sold 
promptly, either to an established producer or to someone willing to take 
considerable risk in an effort to get the plants working to original hopes. 
                                                 
40 Bethlehem’s ongoing operations were sold 18 months after commencement of its 
Chapter 11 proceedings. See, e.g., Press Release, International Steel Group, International 
Steel Group Completes Purchase of Bethlehem Steel Assets (May 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.intlsteel.com/Press/15.pdf; Bethlehem Steel Petitions for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 
BUFFALO BUS. FIRST, Oct. 16, 2001, available at 
www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/stories/2001/10/15/daily5.html?t=printable. 
41 A case in which substantially all of the debtor’s assets are encumbered by liens ex-
ceeding the value of those assets is usually referred to as an “administratively insolvent” 
case. The estate has no free assets to cover administrative expenses or to provide the se-
cured lender with adequate protection for the use of the secured lender’s collateral. Be-
cause the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the use of cash collateral without providing adequate 
protection to the secured creditor or obtaining the secured creditor’s consent, see 11 
U.S.C. §363(c)(2) (2004), the secured creditor usually is in a position to insist upon a sale of 
the business in the administratively insolvent case. 
42 See In re Qualitech Steel, 276 F.3d 245 (7th Cir. 2001); Mellon Bank v. Dick Corp., 
351 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2003). 
43 See id. at 291; Bill Koenig, Banks Get OK to Take Qualitech, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 
20, 1999, at 01C. 
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Within six months, all of Qualitech’s operating assets were sold for less 
than $230 million.44  
Under the rule of absolute priority, Qualitech’s equityholders should 
have been wiped out completely, and they were.45 Indeed, in the great ma-
jority of large Chapter 11s today, equity is wiped out.46 Under absolute pri-
ority, however, Qualitech’s unsecured creditors also should have received 
nothing. Once the debtor’s estate was reduced to cash by a sale, a bright 
line was established between those who were in the money (the secured 
lenders) and those who were not (everyone else). In Qualitech, however, 
this did not happen. The secured lenders agreed to a plan in which $7.5 mil-
lion was distributed to unsecured creditors. Given the millions the secured 
lenders stood to lose every month if the company was not sold, the ability 
of unsecured creditors to delay the consummation of the sale by even a few 
weeks gave them negotiating leverage to extract a payment.47  
Leverage of this type varies, as a practical matter, from one bankruptcy 
case to another depending on the facts of the case and the tolerance of the 
court for litigiousness and delaying tactics. In cases where the business can-
not be operated profitably, merely the amount of time that a bankruptcy 
judge takes to hear and resolve a contested motion can have a significant 
effect on the senior creditors’ recoveries. The senior creditors will receive 
less because of continuing losses suffered by the business, a reduction in its 
sale value during the period of delay, or even the loss of the opportunity to 
sell the business at all. The present value of the proceeds available to the 
senior investors will be less if consummation of the sale is delayed.  
                                                 
44 Bill Koenig, Banks Get OK to Take Qualitech, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 20, 1999, 
at 01C. 
45 See Qualitech, 276 F.3d at 246-47. 
46 During the early years after enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it was 
commonplace in large reorganization cases for pre-bankruptcy equity holders to retain a 
small residual interest in the reorganized company despite being out-of-the-money from an 
absolute priority point of view. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining 
Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 
143 (1990). This practice has diminished in recent years. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 
4, at 692 n.65. 
47 The outcome in U.S. Office Products was similar to the outcome in Qualitech. In 
U.S. Office Products, the major junior creditors agreed to support the orderly sale of the 
debtors’ businesses, and received a small portion of the proceeds of sale after the payment 
of administrative expenses. See, e.g., Katie Anderson, Court OKs US Office Liquidation, DAILY 
DEAL, Dec. 13, 2001; Katie Anderson, Most US Office Creditors Want Liquidation, DAILY 
DEAL, Dec. 10, 2001.  
18 / Absolute Priority & Valuation Uncertainty 
Departures from absolute priority in such cases are, however, diminish-
ing over time.48 In the first 10 years after enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code, bankruptcy judges often permitted out-of-the-money classes to abuse 
the bankruptcy process through delay.49 Because bankruptcy judges today 
appear to have diminishing patience with stalling tactics, it is increasingly 
difficult for out-of-the-money classes to stand in the way of a sale of the 
business, and the prospect of a sale—a market transaction that crystallizes 
the rights of creditors and determines whether junior creditors are entitled 
to receive anything—casts a harsh light on dilatory tactics. This is especially 
so where it is obvious that a sale will bring the most value for the business. 
Simply stated, the hold-up power of out-of-the-money junior classes ac-
counts for fewer unjustified departures from agreed-upon priorities than it 
did in the past. 
More interesting than the hopelessly unprofitable, administratively in-
solvent debtor is the debtor that is profitable on an operating basis (before 
the cost of servicing its pre-bankruptcy debts). Such a company can survive 
on its own if it can reduce its debt load by reorganizing. The debtor has free 
cash flow and the enterprise may have value well in excess of the secured 
creditors’ claims. Under such circumstances, the secured creditors’ ability to 
insist upon a sale in Chapter 11 is significantly diminished. Among other 
things, the secured creditor’s consent may not be required to use cash col-
lateral because the debtor may be able to provide substitute collateral as 
“adequate protection.”50 Because the operations are profitable, the repre-
sentatives of the key creditor constituencies (both senior and junior) have 
the time to take stock of the debtor’s circumstances (either before or after 
                                                 
48 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 692 n.65. Earlier studies suggested that in the 
1980s this was not the case. See Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Untenable 
Case for Chapter 11: A Review of the Evidence, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131, 131 n.12 (1993). 
49 Bankruptcy Courts have regularly been criticized for the extended duration and ex-
cessive cost of Chapter 11 cases. The Chapter 11 of Eastern Airlines is perhaps the most 
cited example. See generally, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 319 (1991). Among other things, it has been suggested that bankruptcy courts have 
permitted excessive extensions the debtor’s exclusive period to file a plan or reorganiza-
tion. See White, supra note 31, at 474.  
50 A Chapter 11 debtor may not use a secured creditor’s cash collateral unless it ob-
tains the secured creditor’s consent or can demonstrate that the secured creditor will be 
“adequately protected” within the meaning of Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 
U.S.C. §363(c) & (e) (2004). If the debtor has free assets to pay administrative expenses 
and provide adequate protection, it should be able to use cash collateral (or obtain debtor-
in-possession financing) without the secured creditor’s consent. In the typical case, an ade-
quate protection package is negotiated and consent is granted. 
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the commencement of Chapter 11 proceedings). After doing so, they still 
may conclude a sale is appropriate, or they have the option of reorganizing.  
Sometimes a prompt bankruptcy auction will yield a greater value for 
the business than any other alternative in the foreseeable future. Chapter 11 
may, for example, create the possibility of a sale to a buyer willing to pay a 
control premium for the distressed enterprise that would not have been 
available outside of bankruptcy. The bankruptcy process can ensure that 
the buyer will receive clean title, free and clear of pre-bankruptcy claims. 
Where the parties believe value can be maximized through a Chapter 11 
sale, all of the in-the-money classes—both senior and junior—may well 
support a sale. In the Chapter 11 proceedings of Budget Rent-A-Car, for 
example, the junior creditors were the ones pushing for a sale to Avis. The 
majority of Budget’s unsecured creditors were strong supporters of the 
deal.51 The sale to Avis generated a premium commonly seen in corporate 
control transactions outside of bankruptcy and left the general creditors 
with more than a traditional reorganization would have. Similarly, in Adel-
phia Communications, it was the junior investors who initially pressed for a 
sale because they believed it would give them more than they would have 
received under a proposed plan.52 
The Reorganization Alternative  
Chapter 11 was not, of course, designed with the principal purpose of 
facilitating sale of the distressed business. It was designed instead to facili-
tate reorganization. Despite the increasing ease with which even the largest 
businesses can be sold and the greater prevalence today of Chapter 11 sales, 
in a substantial number of Chapter 11 cases the business is not sold. The 
failure to sell increasingly reflects not the commandeering of the reorgani-
zation by those who would likely prove to be out-of-the-money in the event 
of a sale, but rather the quite plausible belief on the part of creditors who 
view themselves to be in-the-money that owning the enterprise will pro-
                                                 
51 It makes sense for unsecured creditors, or even equity holders, to push for a sale if 
they believe the bankruptcy process will undervalue the company and reward senior credi-
tors with ownership rights in excess of their entitlements. In Budget’s case, some of its 
unsecured creditors even considered signing a lock-up agreement with Avis before the 
petition date committing themselves to supporting the sale. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra 
note 4, at 693 & n.68.  However, they did not sign such an agreement. Signing might dis-
qualify them from service on the creditors’ committee. By being on the creditors commit-
tee, they would be more likely to be able to ensure that the sale would go through. 
52 See Creditors Devise Fallback Plan If Adelphia Assets Aren't Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2004, at C4; Adelphia Creditors Submit Own Reorganization Plan, AP ALERT COLO., Nov. 9, 
2004. 
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mote their interests more than a sale.53 Sometimes the senior creditors and 
the junior creditors agree that the time is not ripe for a sale of the business 
and both prefer to reorganize. Other times they disagree, with the senior 
creditors preferring a sale (or, as in cases such as Adelphia Communica-
tions, the junior investors preferring one). Either way, the reorganization 
option is squarely on the table. It is to this situation that we now turn. 
While sales are increasingly commonplace in Chapter 11, a significant 
number of businesses – especially larger ones – continue to reorganize. 
Some bargained-for departures from absolute priority in these cases are like 
the ones we saw in Qualitech and U.S. Office Products and are based pri-
marily on “hold-up” value. Even where there is no real dispute that the sen-
ior claims exceed the value of the enterprise, junior creditors may extract a 
token settlement by greasing the skids (or declining to stand in the way) of 
speedy confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Where, however, there is a 
range of values a judge might place on the enterprise, creating a possibility 
that junior investors could be found to be in-the-money, the dynamics are 
totally different. The simplest way to illustrate these dynamics is through a 
hypothetical fact pattern that captures the essential features of a modern 
reorganization case where there is no going-concern sale or prenegotiated 
Chapter 11 plan. 
A Hypothetical Reorganization: American Instruments Corporation  
Founded in 1911 as a business that provided instruments for the auto-
mobile industry, American Instruments Corporation made speedometers 
and fuel gauges. It was the primary supplier for Dodge, Chrysler, and many 
of other automobile manufacturers of the era. American Instruments also 
designed instruments for aircraft, and over time these became its principal 
focus. The company survived the Great Depression, flourished during the 
Second World War and the growth in civilian aviation afterwards. It navi-
gated the changes to instruments that relied increasingly on transistors and 
other electronic components during the 1960s and 1970s. Its sales reached 
$100 million a year in 1980 and approached $500 million by the end of the 
1990s.  
                                                 
53 Adelphia Communications is an example of a case in which the junior classes 
pushed for a market sale. See Peter Thal Larsen, Adelphia Puts Itself Up for Sale: Cable Com-
pany Fails to Persuade Creditors and Shareholders to Accept Independence Plan: Time Warner, Cox and 
Comcast Likely Bidders, FIN. TIMES, April 23, 2004, at 15.  
This perhaps reflects a change in attitudes for senior creditors who today analyze the 
reorganize or sell decision the way a private equity investor might. This change in attitudes 
is explained in part by changes in the composition of the typical senior creditor group (in-
creasingly hedge funds) as well as changes in the business model of traditional senior credi-
tors (banks).     
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In 1999, American Instruments acquired US Gauge, a business that 
specialized in building remote sensors, for $450 million. The synergies 
seemed obvious. US Gauge was a relative newcomer. (A group of engineers 
from Hewlett Packard started the business in the early 1980s.) While its an-
nual revenues were still less than $100 million, its proprietary sensor tech-
nology seemed to be the wave of the future. New fuel efficiencies and the 
introduction of fly-by-wire technology required many more remote sensors 
in modern aircraft, and US Gauge’s designs defined the cutting edge. US 
Gauge’s technology and American Instruments’ customer base and estab-
lished product lines made the two a natural fit. 
To fund its acquisition, American Instruments borrowed $250 million 
from a consortium of banks. It raised an additional $200 million through a 
high-yield bond offering. In conjunction with the acquisition, American 
Instruments changed its corporate structure. First, it formed a wholly 
owned subsidiary, American Instruments Operating Co. All of its operating 
assets were placed in this subsidiary, as well as all the assets of US Gauge. 
The bank loan was made to the operating subsidiary, but the banks also ob-
tained a guarantee from the parent company. The loan was secured by a 
lien on all of the assets of the operating company, including all the debtor’s 
personal property (inventory, equipment, receivables and intangible rights, 
including intellectual property), as well as all of its property, plant and fix-
tures, and the guarantee was secured by a lien on the parent’s stock in the 
subsidiary. Interest on the loans was payable monthly, based on a floating 
interest rate. The bonds were obligations exclusively of the parent company 
and the bonds were contractually subordinated to the bank’s guarantee 
from the parent.54 The bonds required the parent company to pay interest 
semi-annually at a fixed rate.  
Apart from the obligations to the banks and the bondholders, Ameri-
can Instruments has no other borrowings. The operating subsidiary incurs 
many obligations in the course of its operations, such as to employees, ven-
dors, counterparties to executory contracts and leases, and governmental 
entities (principally for taxes). American Instruments has no mass tort li-
abilities, environmental liabilities, pension liabilities or other extraordinary 
                                                 
54 In this case, the subordination agreement contains contain absolute blocks on pay-
ments on the bonds after a default on the bank debt until the bank debt is paid in full in 
cash. Other types of subordination agreements exist. For example, some have a block that 
is limited in duration unless insolvency proceedings are commenced with respect to the 
debtor. Yet others may permit the subordinated debt to retain distributions, even in bank-
ruptcy, if the form of such distributions consists of securities that are junior to the securi-
ties received by the senior creditors. This latter provision is often referred to as an “X 
clause” because it is an exception to strict subordination. For a discussion of “X clauses” 
and their implications, see In re Envirodyne, Inc., 29 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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operating liabilities.55 Apart from the bank loan and the bonds, its operating 
obligations are relatively short term and small in the aggregate when com-
pared to its borrowed money (bank and bond) debt. 
The merger of American Instruments and US Gauge proved unexpect-
edly difficult. The corporate cultures were altogether different. (American 
Instruments was a staid, old-fashioned business based in St. Louis; US 
Gauge a high-tech, more laid-back outfit based in Sunnyvale.) In addition, 
the synergies were harder to realize than expected. US Gauge’s and Ameri-
can Instruments’ sensors both needed to be redesigned to become fully in-
tegrated with each other and this would take time. Moreover, demand in 
the aerospace industry for instruments (and especially for remote sensors) 
fell in 2000. American Instruments’ revenue declined dramatically. By early 
2002, American Instruments was in breach of several financial covenants in 
its loan agreement with the banks. At this point, American Instruments ap-
proached the banks to ask for a waiver of the covenants.56 The banks 
agreed to waive the covenants (in return for a fee and an increase in interest 
rate), and at the same time they began to pay more attention to the loan.57 
By the time American Instruments returns several months later to ask 
for additional waivers, it is having difficulty making the semi-annual interest 
payments on the bonds. In anticipation of the need to restructure its debt, 
the company begins to identify its large bondholders to include in the re-
structuring negotiations. At this point, a number of bondholders are sub-
par purchasers, investors who acquired the debt as an investment opportu-
nity after the company’s fortunes had already begun to decline (at a time 
when the debt was trading at a discount to par).58 After identifying the larg-
                                                 
55 This assumption is somewhat artificial. A company of this type will almost inevita-
bly have other liabilities that, while not large enough to alter the basic dynamics of concern 
to us, play a significant role nevertheless. 
56 Even where the senior debt is changing hands, the lenders typically are part of a 
readily identifiable lender group. This group may consist of several lenders, but sometimes 
may number 50 or more. In most cases, however, one lender is designated “administrative 
agent” in the loan documents. The administrative agent, usually the bank that syndicated 
the original loans, is the conduit for information flow between the company and its lend-
ers. In our case (and in the typical case), the administrative agent is the organizing force 
among the lenders in any debt restructuring, setting up lender/debtor/advisor communica-
tions, as well as spearheading any restructuring negotiations. 
57 For one view of how creditors such as banks monitor and interact with their debtor 
inside of bankruptcy and out, see Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 697-99. 
58 Such sub-par investors include the “troubled debt trading desks” at almost every 
large financial institution, as well as all varieties of private investment funds and other in-
vestors. These investors are highly sophisticated and are exceedingly knowledgeable about 
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est bondholders, the company requests them to organize an informal bond-
holder committee to participate in restructuring negotiations. By encourag-
ing the bondholders to organize themselves, American Instruments’ board 
can be confident that any restructuring proposal will have significant sup-
port within the bondholder group before formal approval is sought. 
As part of the ongoing negotiations, the banks and the committee rep-
resenting the bondholders are supplied with large amounts of information 
about American Instruments and its business.59 They retain, with American 
Instruments’ agreement and at its expense, legal and financial advisors to 
help them evaluate the information and alternative restructuring plans.60 
American Instruments provides the creditor groups and their advisors with 
direct access to its books and records and to its employees for the purposes 
of permitting them to evaluate the company and its restructuring proposals. 
The management, with the assistance of its own financial advisor, account-
ing firm and turnaround experts, develops a long-range business plan for 
the business, which includes detailed projected cash flows and estimates of 
debt capacity.  
In the first several months of 2003, the banks and the bondholder 
committee continue to monitor American Instruments and its business. 
The board hires a turnaround specialist as it Chief Restructuring Officer. 
After several months, it “promotes” the chief executive to the status of 
non-executive Chairman of the Board and makes the turnaround specialist 
the company’s new CEO. As the workout negotiations continue, the new 
management stabilizes and restructures the operations of American Instru-
ments’ core business and prepares to sell its and its non-core businesses. 
The new management team wins the confidence of the bank and the bond-
holder committee. Both believe that the company, as restructured, can con-
sistently turn an operating profit (assuming it can restructure its debt obli-
gations).  
                                                                                                                       
the restructuring process. Many of these investors plan to hold on to the debt only for a 
limited period, but, as is increasingly common, a substantial number to take a longer term 
view and approach their investment the way a private equity investor would. In any event, 
the holders of these bonds are relatively easy to identify and organize. 
59 The greatest difficulty for a troubled company seeking to organize a bondholder 
committee often is the unwillingness of some large holders to participate because to do so 
they would have to gain access to material non-public information about the company and 
its restructuring. Such access would preclude continued trading in the company’s securities 
by such holders. 
60 Paying the expenses of the bondholder committee is simply a device that allows the 
bondholders as a group to share the expenses of the restructuring among themselves. As 
the residual claimants, the bondholders as a class ultimately bear the restructuring costs 
regardless of whether they are reimbursed. 
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The remaining hurdle to reorganizing the company is the negotiation 
over the company’s new capital structure. A debt restructuring is still re-
quired. The banks and the bondholders try to reach agreement outside of 
Chapter 11, but this proves unsuccessful.61 American Instruments is unable 
to make an interest payment to its bondholders. Once the default becomes 
known, trade creditors tighten the reins, and American Instruments, run-
ning out of liquidity, enters Chapter 11. No plan is in place and the banks 
and the bondholders (who will dominate the official Chapter 11 creditors 
committee) must take stock of where things stand. This is not a “free fall” 
bankruptcy. The operational problems of the business are on their way to 
being under control, and the banks and the bondholders have substantially 
similar views about the way the business should be run.  
In the absence of a pre-negotiated deal on a capital restructuring, the 
first question becomes whether the business should be sold. American In-
struments finds itself in a situation different from that in Qualitech, U.S. 
Office Products, Bethlehem Steel, or Budget.62 The banks might prefer a 
sale, but they cannot insist upon one, and the bondholders take the view 
that a current sale is not in their interest. Even the banks recognize that a 
buyer will not pay the highest possible price for the business until the prob-
lems of the business and of the industry are sorted out. 63 The entire aero-
space sector of the economy is depressed. Businesses in its sector are selling 
                                                 
61 In many instances, those in the position of the banks and the bondholder commit-
tee will be able to reach agreement on a debt restructuring outside of bankruptcy. Some-
times the restructuring can be implemented entirely outside of Chapter 11, for example 
through amendments to bank agreements and an exchange offer for the bonds. In other 
cases, the company uses the Chapter 11 process to put in place a deal that already has the 
support of the major players. Indeed, a substantial number of large Chapter 11 cases—
perhaps 30% or so—are cases in which the investors reach such a deal among themselves 
before the Chapter 11 petition is even filed. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 678. The 
business enters Chapter 11 merely as a clean-up operation in which, among other things, 
dissenting members of the impaired creditor classes can be bound by the requisite Chapter 
11 majorities of their classes while the bankruptcy judge assures that the Bankruptcy 
Code’s requirements for protection of their interests are honored.  
A good example is Chiquita. The entity that entered bankruptcy was a holding com-
pany and its bankruptcy lasted only 100 days. See Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 
11, 12 AM. BANKR. INSTITUTE L. REV. 69, 77-78 (2004).  
62 See supra notes 40, 42-47, 51 and accompanying text. 
63 If the banks believe a current sale will realize less than $250 million (after costs of 
sale) and future sale would realize more, they too may prefer to reorganize (as long as they 
receive a sufficient percentage of the future enterprise value in a reorganization to realize 
the full value of their claims on a present value basis and compensate them for the addi-
tional risk they are assuming by deferring a sale). 
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for multiples that are near or at their historic lows. Potential strategic buyers 
face the same problems as American Instruments. They have also lost 
money and have their own debt and liquidity problems. They cannot easily 
enter the capital markets and acquire the resources needed to acquire 
American Instruments.64  
There are, of course, financial investors who specialize in acquiring dis-
tressed businesses such as American Instruments.65 However, financial buy-
ers will adjust their bids to take account of the risks they perceive them-
selves to be running, including the informational disadvantage they have 
relative to the banks and the bondholder committee. To be sure, in a bank-
ruptcy auction (just as in a non-bankruptcy auction) potential bidders typi-
cally are offered full access to factual information they reasonably request 
about the company and its business, including its assets and liabilities, its 
historical financial statements, its contracts, its leases, its employees, its li-
censes, its intellectual property and the like. A (physical or “virtual”) data 
room is created where the bidder and its advisors have the opportunity to 
review these materials. The bidder is given the opportunity to meet with 
current management, and sometimes with current employees. This due dili-
gence can be extraordinarily thorough and the bidder can glean from it the 
information it requires to formulate its own views about the company’s fu-
ture business, prospects, opportunities and risks. Nevertheless, the bidder 
does not have access to the existing management’s own assessments of all 
of these matters. Nor does it have existing management’s plans for the fu-
ture in the event no sale is consummated.  
By contrast, the banks and the bondholder committee have the per-
spective nearly on a par with an insider. They have an insider’s knowledge 
about the ability of the business to successfully bring its next generation of 
instruments and sensors to market. They know what management thinks it 
could do with the business if it is not sold. Because of their pivotal position 
in the restructuring process and the informational advantage they possess, 
these organized creditor representatives have views of the value of the 
debtor that may depart from those of the outside world. From the point of 
view of the banks and the bondholders, third party bids may reflect an un-
due discount because bidders lack the private information to which the 
banks and bondholders have been given access. Put most simply, the banks 
                                                 
64 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market 
Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992). 
65 Wilbur Ross, the buyer of Bethlehem Steel, is one example. See Nicholas Stein, 
Wilbur Ross is a Man of Steel, FORTUNE, May 26, 2003, at 120. 
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and the bondholders face another variation on the standard “lemons” prob-
lem.66  
By comparison to creditors of distressed businesses in an earlier era, 
creditors today (ranging from banks and other financial institutions to uni-
versities, mutual funds and hedge funds) increasingly tend to be profes-
sional investors who are often willing to forego a market sale in order to 
recapitalize the debtor through a stand-alone reorganization.67 The more 
sophisticated the investors and the more promptly they can reach agree-
ment on a plan of reorganization, the less tolerant they will be of imperfec-
tions in the market for sale of the business as a going concern.68 American 
Instruments’ banks and the bondholders, sophisticated investors of this 
type, no longer see a Hobson’s choice between a sale in an illiquid market 
or a costly reorganization. Instead, they see the choice as one between sell-
ing the business to other investors in a developed, but not perfect, market 
or keeping it themselves in a proceeding that has become cheaper69 and eas-
ier to control over time.70  
The rates of return expected by potential buyers may be equally attrac-
tive to American Instruments’ banks and the bondholders. Bidders will set 
their bids based on the rate of return that compensates them for the risks 
they associate with the uncertain future of American. The banks and the 
bondholders may think to themselves, based on their knowledge of the 
                                                 
66 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). Akerlof suggests that used cars are sold for unusually 
low prices because sellers have private information about whether the car is a “lemon.” 
Buyers lower their price accordingly, but then sellers with the best cars decide not to sell. 
This lowers what buyers are willing to pay still further. In the extreme, a market can un-
ravel completely and sales may cease altogether. 
67 See Goldschmid, supra note 25, at 200-06. 
68 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 416 
(1990). 
69 Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large 
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 114 (2004) (explaining that 
professional fees have fallen 57% since the 1980s). 
70 Indeed, a common complaint about modern large Chapter 11s is the degree of con-
trol senior creditors now seem to enjoy over the process. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Warren 
& Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, Sept. 2003 (“We 
have a new form of chapter 11 emerging in the courts. Having invented the DIP (debtor-
in-possession), American lawyers are now creating the SPIP (secured-party-in-possession). 
More and more chapter 11 cases seem to be no more than vehicles through which secured 
parties may enjoy their Article 9 rights under the umbrella, and protective shield, of the 
bankruptcy laws.”). 
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company, “This bidder probably has a rate-of-return hurdle on the pur-
chase price of 30 percent. But the risks aren’t that large. Why should we let 
him get away with stealing the business for that price? We can just fix the 
business, sell it in several years, and earn that return for ourselves.” As long 
as the banks and the bondholders are confident of their own assessment of 
the business and their ability to control the reorganization process, they 
may prefer to own rather than sell. The central problem that remains is ne-
gotiation of the allocation between them of the value of the business.  
At the outset, the committee of unsecured creditors formed in the 
Chapter 11 case will examine whether the banks failed to perfect their secu-
rity interests, failed to include assets in the security agreement, or otherwise 
opened their priority to attack. If they can point to possible infirmities in 
the banks’ position, some of them may be able to share in the estate even if 
the banks are not paid in full.71 For example, in the Chapter 11 of Sunbeam 
Corporation, out-of-the-money subordinated debenture holders were able 
to extract 1.5% of the equity by claiming rights arising out of alleged prepe-
tition financial misdeeds.72 In WKI Holding, some bondholders increased 
their stake of the new equity from 5.1% to 8.35% by threatening to probe 
transactions between its parent and an affiliate of the parent that was also a 
secured creditor of the debtor.73 The “departures” from bargained-for pri-
ority that appear in such cases are in fact nothing of the sort, but rather re-
flect the uncertainty (albeit often small) about whether an investor who 
claims to be senior is in fact entitled to priority.74 
Let us assume, however, that American Instruments’ banks enjoy a pri-
ority position that is watertight, the bankruptcy judge is completely commit-
ted to the absolute priority rule, and the junior investors have relatively little 
ability to extract value by holding up the process. American Instruments is 
not administratively insolvent. Its reorganization value will comfortably ex-
ceed the value of the banks’ secured claims and any administrative expenses 
                                                 
71 In the case of American, the bondholders have very little gain from this review. 
Even if there are gaps in the liens, the bondholders have agreed to be contractually subor-
dinated. Vendors and other unsecured creditors, of course, are not subordinated to the 
banks, and would benefit if gaps in the banks liens were found or if the liens were void-
able.   
72 See Sunbeam Announces Court's Confirmation of Plan of Reorganization, PR NEWSWIRE, 
Nov. 25, 2002. 
73 See Soma Biswas, World Kitchen Reorg Plan OK'd, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 16, 2002. 
74 Cases may simultaneously involve disputes over priority and over enterprise value. 
See, e.g., In re Exide Technologies, 303 B.R. 48, 60-61, 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).  For the 
purposes of analysis, these sorts of disputes and their negotiated outcomes should be sepa-
rately considered. 
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associated with its bankruptcy proceedings.75 The company can be reorgan-
ized and general unsecured creditors can expect some sort of recovery on 
their claims.  
American Instruments is the prototypical case our corporate reorgani-
zation laws were designed to address. The interaction between in-the-
money classes of different priority is the key to the restructuring process. 
The negotiations are among a relatively small group of professional inves-
tors and their experienced advisors who can be counted upon to cast a cold 
eye on the business and the likely course of any litigation. The subject of 
that negotiations is the proper allocation between them of the company’s 
ownership – the equity of the reorganized enterprise, which depends, ulti-
mately, upon the value of the enterprise. If the parties cannot reach a deal, 
the valuation issue will be decided by the court as it applies the absolute 
priority rule.  
As in litigation generally, the banks and the bondholders can make 
themselves jointly better off by reaching a deal. If the parties can strike a 
deal, each can avoid the costs of a judicial valuation. More importantly, 
American Instruments lives in an industry in which long-term supply con-
tracts are an essential part of the business.76 Unless it can convince buyers 
                                                 
75 It should not be surprising that the banks find themselves fully secured and the 
business is still worth saving. The banks design triggers in their debt obligations (due dates 
of payments and financial covenants) to bring parties to the table before matters deterio-
rate to a point at which the business lacks a value, on a going-concern basis, that exceeds 
the amount of its secured debt. 
If matters become that bad, the dynamic in the case would be utterly different. The 
banks would control the cash collateral. The debtor would be unable to find a debtor-in-
possession lender because the modern bankruptcy judges are unlikely to give the DIP 
lender a lien that primed the secured creditor. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24, at __ 
(“[C]ourts are unlikely to grant such orders over vigorous opposition.”).  Under these cir-
cumstances, the secured lender would be able to keep the debtor on a tight leash and dic-
tate the course of the case. The inability of the debtor to support itself would render the 
junior creditors relatively powerless. A relatively speedy sale would usually be the outcome. 
76 The need to leave bankruptcy earlier rather than later may stem from a number of 
different factors. In the case of Conseco, Inc., the debtor needed to regain its AM Best 
rating for the insurance businesses to be viable. See, e.g., Dan Ackman, Conseco Turnaround 
Runs Aground, FORBES.COM, Dec. 18, 2002, 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/12/18/cx_da_1218topnews.html.  To do so, the holding 
companies, which owned the stock of Conseco’s insurance subsidiaries, had to emerge 
quickly from Chapter 11 with a strong balance sheet. For an account of how Conseco’s 
weak balance sheet was compromising the ability of the insurance subsidiaries to compete, 
both before bankruptcy and while it was in it, see Chris O’Malley, Insurance Group Faces 
Challenge, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, December 18, 2002, at 1A. 
  Absolute Priority & Valuation Uncertainty / 29 
 
that its financial problems are behind it and that it will be around for the 
long haul, its ability to improve earnings are compromised.  
The environment in which the senior and junior creditors find them-
selves, while typical of many large Chapter 11 reorganizations, is quite for-
eign to most academic accounts of the absolute priority rule and departures 
from it. There is no plausible claim that the ex ante bargain called for any-
thing other than absolute priority. The negotiations are among profession-
als. The subordination of the bondholders to the banks was established 
through contract. Every bondholder knew at the outset the nature and the 
extent of the banks’ priority. We are not dealing with tort victims or work-
ers or any other nonadjusting creditors. The managers are newly hired turn-
around specialists, not an entrepreneur whose firm-specific skills are essen-
tial to the business nor a well-entrenched owner-manager who exclusively 
possesses valuable private information. Those in charge—the turnaround 
specialists—want to move the case forward. Their incentives are aligned 
with the creditors, not the shareholders. Private information plays no role 
in the bargaining; the banks and the bondholder committee may have dif-
ferent beliefs about the value of the business and the way the bankruptcy 
judge will assess that value, but neither group has information denied to the 
other. The bondholders’ ability to extract value through delaying tactics is 
muted. There is no fuzziness about the banks’ priority position, nor is there 
doubt about the commitment of the bankruptcy judge to respecting the 
bargain between the banks and the bondholders.  
In this environment, the banks and the bondholders are likely to behave 
in a very predictable way. They are likely to agree on a consensual plan of 
reorganization in which the bondholders end up with junior securities in 
the reorganized business, the value of which depends heavily on the future 
performance of the business. In the next part of the paper, we explore the 
bargaining dynamics at work and suggest why the outcome between the 
banks and the bondholders takes this form.  
 
III.  
Bargaining Over Reorganization Allocations in the Face of  
Valuation Uncertainty  
Many accounts of bargaining in Chapter 11 assume it possesses a dy-
namic peculiar to businesses in financial distress. However, bargaining in 
Chapter 11 is no different from any other negotiation that takes place in the 
shadow of litigation. The dynamics at work are captured by the standard 
settlement model, in which parties to the negotiations have different beliefs 
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about the likely outcome of the litigation.77 This model can be applied to 
our American Instruments hypothetical. 
Bargaining between American Instruments’ banks and bondholders 
turns on the parties’ views of how the bankruptcy judge will value the busi-
ness. There are at least three sources of valuation uncertainty, all of which 
will be considered by the court. First, much is unknown about the pros-
pects for the economy generally and the market for the types of goods that 
American Instruments produces. Second, much is unknown about Ameri-
can Instruments itself, including the strength of its new management team 
and the quality of the next generation of its product line. Third, much is 
unknown about the future cost of risk-free capital, which affects the rate at 
which the market will discount American Instruments’ future earnings po-
tential in evaluating its value as a business enterprise. As to each of these 
uncertainties, the banks and the bondholders may have different beliefs, but 
neither has an informational advantage over the other and both know as 
much or more than any outsider. 
These uncertainties exist in every case, but the need to use markets to 
monetize the value of the business is reduced where the parties have the 
expertise to weigh the risks and come to their own educated view regarding 
the value of the enterprise. The experienced professional investors who to-
day tend to displace passive investors as financial distress approaches are 
likely to have this expertise. They are as well qualified to restructure and 
maximize the return on the business at this moment in its life cycle as any 
financial bidder who might purchase the business.78 The value of the busi-
ness in their hands is likely to be as high as it would be in the hands of the 
purchaser. Together with their advisors, they are well qualified to assess that 
value for purposes of negotiating how such value should be allocated under 
a plan of reorganization. 
When the parties to the reorganization negotiations, like American In-
struments’ banks and the bondholders, can form a sophisticated view on 
the value of the enterprise, they can resolve the valuation issue through 
their own action. One can conceive of a mechanism that would force the 
                                                 
77 See generally William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 
61 (1971). Alternative models of settlement are based on bargaining in the face of private 
information. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 
15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 408-09 (1984). As between the banks and the bondholders, how-
ever, there is no private information. 
78 In some cases, the business will be more valuable to a strategic investor than to a fi-
nancial investor. In such circumstances, the business is more likely to be sold. In the 
American Instruments hypothetical, it is assumed that strategic buyers are not in a position 
to be competitive bidders. 
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junior investor to buy out the senior investor to preserve the value the jun-
ior investor's interest in the business. It would effectively require the junior 
investor to “put up or shut up” based on the junior investor’s own views of 
the value of the business. Based on her view of the value of the business, 
the junior investor would decide whether, as a risk-reward proposition, she 
has enough confidence that the value of the enterprise will exceed the sen-
ior investor’s claims to buy out the senior investors’ position. Alternatively, 
one could provide for an allocation of ownership of the enterprise based on 
a judicial appraisal, but allow the parties to avoid this allocation by agreeing 
to an allocation amongst themselves. The latter approach—the one adopted 
in Chapter 11—avoids the need for consideration to change hands between 
the parties. In the absence of a settlement, it “divides the baby” based on 
the judge’s determination of value, which may depart from what either the 
senior investor or the junior investor think the business is worth.  
Let us examine these two alternative reorganization procedures—
forced sale and judicial appraisal—more closely.  
The “Forced Sale” Model 
Situations in which the owners of a business need to reallocate owner-
ship interests among themselves are commonplace. Two parties to a joint 
venture decide to go their separate ways. Two partners no longer want to 
work with each other and one must buy the other out. In such situations, 
parties often agree in advance to a dissolution mechanism that puts a value 
on the business and allows one party to buy the other out. A standard 
mechanism is “the Texas shoot-out.”79 One of the parties sets out a dollar 
figure and the other must buy out the first party’s interest or sell her own 
for that price. When neither party faces any liquidity constraints, this 
mechanism forces the party who makes the offer to reveal the value she 
places on the business. For this reason, this mechanism has a distinct ad-
vantage over use of a third-party appraiser. It takes advantage of the private 
information the parties have, but cannot credibly convey to a third party. 
Alternatively, the two parties may agree on using a third party to put a 
value on the venture when it is terminated. For example, the contract may 
give one of the parties the right to to sell its interest in the venture to the 
other partner for the price the appraiser sets.80 This “put” mechanism is 
                                                 
79 See generally Richard R.W. Brooks & Kathryn E. Spier, Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dis-
solving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts (Yale Law & Economics Research Pa-
per No. 298, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=556164. 
80 For examples of such contracts, see Keith Scharfman, Valuation Averaging: New Pro-
cedure for Resolving Valuation Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 364-65 (2003) (describing con-
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particularly useful when the partner who wants to terminate the venture 
does not have the liquidity to buy the other out, a sine qua non of the dis-
solution mechanism that uses the I-pick-you-choose principle. 
Both of these mechanisms invoke a “forced sale” to resolve the value 
allocation issue. The “Texas Shoot Out” lets the parties set the price; the 
appraisal method leaves the valuation to a third party. Importantly, both of 
these mechanisms by-pass any need for negotiation between the parties.  
A law of corporate reorganizations also could insist upon a market 
mechanism or one that took advantage of the private information the par-
ties possess by forcing one to buy the other out. Indeed, as others have ob-
served, the hierarchical nature of the parties’ interests in the distressed 
debtor makes such mechanisms, in theory at least, easy to implement. The 
reorganization procedure would be comparatively simple. It would permit 
the junior investor to buy out the senior investor for the amount of the sen-
ior investor’s claim.81 There are any number of variations on such a mecha-
nism. They all take advantage of the private information the junior investor 
is presumed to possess. As long as the junior investor faces no liquidity 
constraints and in fact has sufficient information to perform an educated 
evaluation, she will buy out the senior investor if, but only if, the business 
is, in the junior investor’s view, worth more than the senior investor is 
owed. The senior investor cannot complain if she is paid in full, and the 
willingness of the junior investor to buy out the senior investor reveals that, 
in her own eyes, her ownership interest in the business is not out-of-the-
money. 
Whether such a mechanism is one parties would bargain for in advance, 
however, is not clear. It relies critically on the ability of the junior investor 
to accurately assess the value of the business and to muster the capital to 
buy out the senior investor’s position. Because of the private information 
the existing investors possess and because a prudent lender, even with full 
information, will lend against an asset only a fraction of the value of the 
business (determined without the benefit of private information), the junior 
investor typically cannot borrow against the business from a third-party 
lender funds sufficient to pay off the senior investor. Moreover, the addi-
tional investment that the junior investor must make under this mechanism 
is difficult to diversify against. This is especially true where the “junior in-
vestor” is in reality a large group of disparate investors (e.g., bondholders) 
                                                                                                                       
tractual valuation mechanisms using expert appraisers in Merck/Schering-Plough and Ver-
izon/Vodafone joint ventures). 
81 See Bebchuk, supra note 34, at 781-88. Even apart from liquidity problems, this 
mechanism can work effectively only if the priority positions of all the investors is clear. In 
many cases it is not. 
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who may not be in communication with each other and not all of whom, in 
any event have access to private information. In the case of American In-
struments, for example, the bondholders would collectively have to put 
$250 million at risk, something they might not be willing or able to do as a 
concerted group even if the largest holders, with the benefit of private in-
formation, believed that, in expectation, the business was worth more than 
$250 million.82 
Recognizing the practical difficulties in the corporate reorganization 
context of imposing on junior investors a forced sale that takes advantage 
of private information, we next turn to the alternative model actually 
adopted by our reorganization laws – the “judicial appraisal” model of cor-
porate reorganization.  
The Judicial Appraisal Model 
Modern Chapter 11 is the equivalent of a provision in a joint venture 
agreement that calls for the appointment of an appraiser and uses the num-
ber that the appraiser sets (or is expected to set) as the baseline against 
which to measure the rights of the parties. In the abstract, one cannot say 
whether such a regime makes sense. We see sophisticated parties adopt 
such mechanisms in analogous environments.83 Nevertheless, adopting 
such a mechanism, like any other valuation mechanism, has predictable 
consequences. In particular, any valuation mechanism that does not involve 
a transaction that monetizes the senior investors’ position (through a sale of 
the business or a buy-out of the position) creates option value in the posi-
tion of the junior investors. This will be priced into any deal the parties 
strike with each other that avoids the need to complete the valuation. 
We can understand the bargaining dynamic between the banks and the 
bondholders in American Instruments by imagining an even simpler exam-
ple. Firm is a debtor in Chapter 11. Its only asset is an oil well. The only 
source of uncertainty is over the amount of oil beneath the ground. It has 
two creditors, Bank and Lender. Bank has lent $250 and Lender $200. Bank 
has a security interest in all of Firm’s assets. Bank and Lender each know as 
much about the amount of oil in the ground as the other. They have read 
the same geologist reports. They know Firm’s own experience and its man-
                                                 
82 Today, even in the absence of a bankruptcy law requirement, junior investors could 
offer to buy out senior investors as a group, especially, as is commonly the case, where all 
of the senior investors are party to a single syndicated bank credit agreement. Typically, 
however, while senior claims trades and junior investors are sometimes buyers, such trans-
actions are trades between individual holders, normally at a discount to par.   
83 See Scharfman, supra note 80, at 364-65. 
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agers’ intuitions about how much oil is there. They can convey much of 
what they know to an outsider, but not everything.  
We can imagine a number of different variations on this hypothetical. 
Let us assume first that Bank and Lender share the same beliefs about the 
amount of oil in the ground. They both believe it is worth $250. No outside 
buyer, however, will pay that much for the oil well. The outside buyer will 
bid less, as it must discount for the possibility that Bank and Lender are 
selling the oil well because their private information tells them the well is 
worth less than it seems.  
Bank and Lender believe that the average estimate of 100 fully in-
formed appraisers would be the same as their own, but they recognize that 
any individual appraiser might be higher or lower. The standard deviation is 
10%. Bank and Lender also believe that a bankruptcy judge who listens to 
expert witnesses is in the same position as an unbiased appraiser. Over the 
course of a 100 cases, her median valuation, like the appraisers’, will be 
$250, but there is again a standard deviation of 10%. The bankruptcy re-
gime allows Lender to insist on a valuation hearing and the valuation hear-
ing costs Lender and Bank $2.50 each. What happens when Bank and 
Lender negotiate in the shadow of a valuation hearing in this environment? 
Lender’s ability to insist on a valuation hearing is an option that has 
value. The bankruptcy judge is, by assumption, an unbiased appraiser 
whose expertise is as good as that of any third party expert. Nevertheless, 
the bankruptcy judge does not know the amount of oil in the well with cer-
tainty and this uncertainty is itself a source of value to Lender. To be sure, 
when the bankruptcy judge finds that the business is worth less than $250 
(which she will do half the time), Lender receives nothing. But in the re-
maining cases, the bankruptcy judge will find that the business is worth 
more than $250. In these cases, Lender will receive the difference between 
the value the bankruptcy judge applies to the business and $250. With a 
standard deviation of 10%, the “cram up” option that Lender enjoys is 
worth $10.84 
The right to demand a valuation hearing before an impartial bankruptcy 
judge, like the right to demand an independent third-party appraisal, comes 
with subtle distributional effects. Seen after the fact, the junior investor is 
better off and the senior investor is correspondingly worse off than they 
                                                 
84 The expected value the bankruptcy judge will place on the company is equal to the 
value of Bank’s $250 claim. Lender accordingly has an expected gain in the event of litiga-
tion because it can never get less than nothing and half the time it will get more. Bank has 
an expected loss in the event of litigation for the same reason Lender has an expected gain. 
Bank can never receive more than the entire company after a valuation and half the time it 
will get something less.   
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would be in the counterfactual world in which the property was sold for the 
amount both Bank and Lender believe it is worth. The junior investor is 
also better off than she would be in a world in which she faced no liquidity 
constraints, but was obliged to buy out the senior investor’s claim in order 
to continue her interest in the business. If she were required to buy out the 
senior investor at par, she might realize the upside, but could also lose a 
portion of her investment in the senior claims if the business turned out to 
be worth less than expected. If, instead, she can impose a value allocation 
based on a judicial appraisal, she benefits from the upside but has no addi-
tional investment at risk on the downside.85  
The Impact of “Appraisal Variance” 
The parties to the reorganization negotiations will each have their own 
view of the value of the enterprise.  Their respective valuations – which 
may, as in our example, be the same, or may be different – are based on 
their respective assessments of a number of variables, such as their expecta-
tions regarding the range and probability of different real world outcomes 
for the business, and their subjective views regarding valuation methodol-
ogy, discount rates, and the like. An appraiser may share one or the other of 
the parties’ views regarding these subjects, or may have different views.86 
Each party accordingly faces the possibility that the appraised value of the 
enterprise will depart from the party’s own valuation, and the party’s expec-
tations regarding the probability and the potential magnitude of such a de-
parture directly impacts the party’s negotiating strategy. We call the risk of 
such departures, “appraisal variance.” 
To illustrate the impact appraisal variance has on reorganization nego-
tiations, compare a regime involving the option of a judicial appraisal with 
one in which both Bank and Lender must wait until the oil has been ex-
tracted from the ground and the amount of oil in the well is fixed with cer-
tainty. Whether the opportunity to force an appraisal has an impact on ne-
                                                 
85 Exercising the junior investor’s “option” may not, however, be cost free if the jun-
ior investor’s has to bear the cost of litigating the valuation issue. If a creditors’ committee 
prosecutes the valuation litigation on behalf of the junior investor, the junior investor will 
be relieved the costs of litigation (which would be borne by the debtor, and, therefore, 
indirectly by the senior investor). See infra note 92. 
86 In practice, bankruptcy judges may exhibit greater appraisal variance than randomly 
selected experts. Variance decreases with greater information and the adversarial process 
itself limits the ability of the judge to gather information. The bankruptcy judge bases her 
appraisal on conflicting testimony from experts who themselves may be biased. They are 
advocates for a particular valuation perspective that serves the objectives of the litigants 
who selected them, and will tend for that reason to represent more extreme ends of the 
range of credible opinion.  
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gotiating incentives depends on whether there is a difference between the 
parties’ expectations regarding appraisal variance on the one hand and the 
parties’ expectations regarding the variance of real world outcomes on the 
other. In a simple case, it might be that Bank and Lender both believe that 
the expected quantity of oil is worth $250, but also believe that, just as with 
respect to appraisals, there is a standard deviation in the real world out-
comes of 10%.87 Under these circumstances, the bargain that Bank and 
Lender strike in the appraisal regime should be comparable, in terms of dis-
tributional consequences, to a regime that simply obliged the parties to wait. 
Bank and Lender could, for example, agree upon a new capital structure in 
which Bank receives 100% of the equity and Lender has the option in two 
year’s time to buy Bank’s equity for $250 plus a risk-adjusted market rate of 
return.88 Even if Lender faces liquidity constraints now, these will disappear 
when the oil is extracted and its quantity is known. Bank will receive its en-
tire $250 plus compensation for delay before Lender receives anything. The 
deal preserves the option value associated with Lender’s junior position in 
the same way an appraisal would in the event the oil turns out to be worth 
more than $250. Because the expected variance associated with the ap-
praisal is the same as the expected variance associated with the real world 
outcome, the ability to insist on an appraisal should not affect the negotiat-
ing positions of the parties.  
There is no guarantee, however, that the parties’ expectations regarding 
the variance associated with an appraisal will match the parties’ expectations 
regarding the variance in real world outcomes. First, imagine a situation in 
which there is no appraisal variance despite a wide variance in real world 
outcomes. A business whose only asset is a lottery ticket that has a one in 
ten chance of paying $2500. Bank is again owed $250. There is no ambigu-
ity about the expected value of the ticket, nor any doubt that all third-party 
appraisers would fix on it a value of $250. The outcome where Lender has a 
right to insist on a third-party valuation is no different from the outcome if 
Lender were obliged to buy out Bank’s position or the lottery ticket were 
sold in the market place. Lender would receive nothing under any of these 
scenarios. Lender’s claim could, however, have value if Lender can force a 
delay. Where the appraisal variance is small compared to the parties’ expec-
                                                 
87 The variables that make it hard to predict the expected result of a third-party ap-
praisal also make it hard to predict the actual output of the well. For our purposes, how-
ever, what matters is that Bank and Lender have less valuation variance than anyone else 
by virtue of their access to private information. 
88 Because Bank is taking equity risk – the oil extracted turns out to be worth less than 
$250, it would bargain for a “blended” return reflecting this risk before Lender could par-
ticipate in recoveries.   
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tations regarding real world outcomes for the business, the senior investor 
should favor an immediate day of reckoning that collapses future values to 
the present, even if the mechanism for implementing the day of reckoning 
is an appraisal. The junior investor should favor delay. 
But once we recognize appraisal variance, it is no longer the case that 
junior investors necessarily favor delay. Consider the case in which the ex-
pected appraisal variance is greater than Bank and Lender’s own uncertainty 
about the actual value of the business. To the extent, for example, Bank 
and Lender are better informed about the amount of oil in the well, the 
variance among the appraisals may be greater than their own expectations 
about the variance in the amount of oil in the ground. In such situations, 
Lender’s ability to insist on an immediate appraisal has value. If the ap-
praisal variance is large compared to the senior investor’s own expectations 
regarding the variance in real world outcomes for the business, the senior 
investor should favor delaying an appraisal until the real world outcomes 
are better known. 89  
If the senior investor can force a speedy day of reckoning, the senior 
investor should be inclined to do so where there is little appraisal variance. 
The senior investor can insist upon a prompt valuation and request that the 
junior investor be “crammed down.” When the outcome of the valuation 
process carries greater uncertainty, it is the junior investor who has the in-
centive to seek an appraisal of the enterprise today. Where the appraisal 
variance is large, the threat of “cram-up” is a potent one, well understood 
in practice, but wholly neglected in theory.  
In sum, uncertainty over the outcome of a valuation generates option 
value. When there is sufficient uncertainty over the outcome of an unbiased 
valuation, the ability of the junior investor to force a valuation has value 
even when there is no disagreement between the parties about the uncer-
tainties associated with the appraisal and the appraisal is completely unbi-
ased. A rational senior investor will take into account the value of the junior 
investor’s option (or, more specifically, the threat that it will be exercised by 
voting against the reorganization plan) in making any settlement offer. A 
senior investor’s willingness to “buy” this option from the junior investor 
will naturally lead to plans of reorganization in which the junior investor 
                                                 
89 It should be noted, however, that the senior investor will tolerate greater appraisal 
variance if the expected value of the enterprise is sufficiently low. Where the expected 
value is sufficiently low, appraisals at the high end of the range of variance still may not 
cover the senior investor’s claim. In such cases, the senior investor should favor a speedy 
appraisal even where the appraisal variance exceeds her expectations regarding the variance 
of real world outcomes. The dynamic at work here is related to, but ultimately distinct 
from the similar dynamic Adler identifies in bargaining between senior and junior lenders. 
See Adler, supra note 19, at 226−29. 
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participates, even though, by the terms of the contractual bargain separated 
from the valuation problem, the junior investor should not participate 
based on the expected value both parties place on the business.90 
If the senior investor and the junior investor share the same view of the 
business’s prospects and the way in which the bankruptcy judge will assess 
them, a settlement range exists that makes both the senior investor and the 
junior investor better off. They are likely to reach an agreement in which 
the junior investor is paid the value of its option to insist upon a valuation 
and the parties allocate between them the savings they would realize from 
bypassing the valuation process. These would include the direct costs of the 
process itself and the indirect costs of delaying the business’s emergence 
from bankruptcy.91 
Negotiating in the Face of Appraisal Variance: Postponing the Day of Reckoning 
 If appraisal variance is expected to be large, the key question in plan of 
reorganization negotiations between Bank and Lender is how to allocate 
reorganization distributions in a way that accounts for the value of Lender’s 
cram-up option (the ability to impose on the senior investor the risk that 
the bankruptcy judge will settle on a value for the business that is at the 
high end of the range of variance). As suggested above, this is so even 
where Bank and Lender share the same view about the expected outcome 
and the likely variance of the judicial appraisal.  
The parties may, however, find it difficult to agree on the value of 
Lender’s option. If they do, there is another alternative they can explore. 
They can agree to postpone the day of reckoning by preserving Lender’s 
option until a later date, by which time it is hoped the value of the enter-
                                                 
90 The observation we make here—that an ex ante agreement for absolute priority will 
in fact yield something less than absolute priority ex post—raises a second set of questions. 
The efficient investment contract in fact might be one that provides for absolute priority 
ex post. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1812-13. If this is so, we should ask whether devices 
are available to investors to allow ex ante contracting that would in fact yield absolute pri-
ority. To frame things differently, is there a way to write an ex ante absolute priority con-
tract that is renegotiation proof? What is the evidence that parties are trying to write such 
contracts (for example through the creation of bankruptcy remote single purpose financing 
vehicles)? If our reorganization system precludes such contracts from being written, or 
makes their enforcement more difficult, is the cost this imposes for the sake of preserving 
the opportunity to reorganize sufficiently counterbalanced by benefits derived from pre-
serving this opportunity? These lines of inquiry and others like it are the ones that should 
be pursued, rather than ever more elaborate models that seek to explain apparent depar-
tures from absolute priority on the basis of private information and firm-specific human 
capital. 
91 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 607-10 (5th ed. 1998). 
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prise can be more readily established in the market. While this type of solu-
tion raises some tricky governance issues (specifically, control of the busi-
ness during the period of postponement), postponing the day of reckoning 
permits Bank and Lender to save the cost of the valuation while preserving 
their relative rights. An example of such a solution would be for Bank and 
Lender to agree to a plan that allows Lender to buy out Bank’s interest sev-
eral years hence, providing Bank with an appropriate rate of return in the 
interim. Another possibility would be to design a distribution allocation 
procedure with a built-in adjustment mechanism that locks in the final allo-
cation of investor participation only after the market has reliably established 
the value of the enterprise.   
The usefulness of postponing the day of reckoning can be seen if we 
complicate our example by assuming that the appraisal process not only 
exhibits substantial variance, but also that Bank and Lender have different 
beliefs about the likely outcome or variance associated with the appraisal. 
This will make it more difficult or perhaps even impossible for the parties 
to agree upon the value of the junior investor’s option. However, as we 
shall see, if the parties agree to postpone the day of reckoning, there may be 
negotiated solutions that will satisfy both parties.  
Assume that Bank believes the judge will share its own view of Firm’s 
value and find that, in two year’s time, Firm will be worth either $225 with 
80% probability or $375 with 20% probability. Collapsing these possibilities 
yields an expected valuation of $255. By contrast, Lender believes that the 
judge will share its view that, in two year’s time, Firm will be worth $225 
with 20% probability or $375 with 80% probability. This results in an ex-
pected value of $345. A valuation hearing costs Bank $20 and Lender $15.92 
Under these assumptions, Lender expects to receive $80 if it contests valua-
tion.93 Bank, however, will spend no more than $25 to settle with Lender. 
                                                 
92 The assumption that Lender will bear fewer of the costs of the valuation hearing is 
plausible. See Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Cash Auctions vs. Chapter 11 
Bargaining 7-8 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-13, 2004), available at 
http://www.nber.org/confer/2004/si2004/cf/bris.pdf. If the official creditors’ committee 
carries the burden of the valuation proceeding and if the plan ultimately provides the jun-
ior creditors with contingent rights of participation, part of the cost of the process will 
shift from the junior creditors to the senior creditors. (In states of the world in which jun-
ior creditors have options that turn out to be out of the money, the costs of the bank-
ruptcy borne by the debtor are borne entirely by the senior creditor.) Of course, if all pay-
outs are in cash at the end of the case, then the junior creditors bear the cost as long as the 
debtor is not administratively insolvent.  
93 The bankruptcy judge will find that Firm is worth $345 and will give Lender a share 
in the reorganized firm that is worth $95. Less the $15 cost of the litigation, Lender realizes 
$80. 
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Bank believes Firm is worth only $255 and it expects to receive $230 after a 
valuation hearing.94 From its perspective, a settlement with Lender (acquir-
ing Lender’s interest in the firm) can benefit it only to the extent of the dif-
ference between the two. No cash settlement will make both parties better 
off than they expect to be after the valuation hearing.  
Bank and Lender will look for alternatives to a cash settlement. In a 
world in which Lender faced no liquidity constraints, Lender would buy 
Bank out. Lender believes Firm is worth $345 and its own stake is worth 
$95. Hence, it would pay up to $250 to acquire outright ownership. By con-
trast, Bank believes that a valuation process will bring it only $230. Hence, a 
bargain exists in which Lender and Bank are both better off. If those in 
Lender’s position generally faced no liquidity constraints, the law of corpo-
rate reorganizations could simply provide that Bank succeeds to the entire 
Firm unless Lender is willing to pay it the face amount of its loan.95 As we 
have noted, however, Lender is likely to be subject to liquidity constraints.96 
Bank and Lender find themselves facing a bankruptcy court valuation only 
because Firm is not readily marketable. Lender and Bank value Firm more 
than outsiders do. They have private information that prospective buyers 
do not. The conditions that give rise to the situation in which Bank and 
Lender find themselves are inconsistent with Lender having the ability to 
raise the capital needed to buy out Bank’s position.  
Bank and Lender can, however, still find common ground. They can 
look to a mechanism that defers the final allocation of their ownership par-
ticipation in the reorganized enterprise until the value of the enterprise is 
better known. Consider, for example, a settlement in which Firm acquires 
an all-equity capital structure. Bank receives all the equity in Firm, but 
Lender enjoys the right to buy the equity of Firm from it in two years time 
for $275. Bank and Lender do as well with such a bargain as they would by 
going through a valuation process. This plan gives Bank an expected return 
of $235, $5 more than it would receive in a valuation hearing.97 The plan 
                                                 
94 Bank believes that the bankruptcy judge will agree with its valuation and hold that 
Firm is worth $255. Because Bank is owed $250, the judge will give it virtually the entire 
reorganized firm. After spending $20 on the valuation hearing, it is left with $230. 
95 Lucian Bebchuk was the first to make this point. See Bebchuk, supra note 34, at 781-
88. 
96 Even apart from the issues raised here, the bondholders who occupy Lender’s posi-
tion in a case such as American Instruments are dispersed. Working in concert becomes 
even harder if they must make capital contributions. 
97 Bank believes that Firm will be worth $225 in eight cases in ten. When Firm finds 
itself in such circumstances, Lender will not exercise the option, and Bank will remain the 
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gives Lender an expected return of $80, an amount equal to what it expects 
to receive in a valuation procedure.98 The liquidity problem that Lender 
faces today will not exist in two years, as by then the market for Firm’s se-
curities will have established itself and Lender will be able to borrow the 
money needed to exercise the option or it will be able to sell the option to 
someone else. 
In the case described above, both Bank and Lender believe the ex-
pected value of Firm exceeds the amount Bank is owed. They merely dis-
agree about the size of the expected surplus. Even if, however, Bank be-
lieved the expected value of Firm were not sufficient to pay it in full, it 
might nonetheless believe the valuation variance is sufficiently large so that 
Lender could be in the money if the judge’s valuation were at the high end 
of the valuation range. Under such circumstances, Bank would still have an 
incentive to offer Lender some continuing rights against Firm to reflect the 
value of the option implicit in the right to insist on a valuation. Especially in 
such circumstances, Bank may find it far easier to offer Lender some form 
of contingent rights that defer Lender’s final day of reckoning than it would 
be to offer Lender a cash settlement or some other finite participation in-
terest in the ongoing firm.  
The possible features of such contingent rights and the flexibility parties 
have to tailor them to the value (or lack of value) implicit in the junior in-
vestor’s position is the topic to which we now turn. 
 
IV.  
The Use of Options to Settle Valuation Issues in Reorganization 
Cases 
So far we have suggested that, to a far greater extent than commonly 
appreciated, bargained-for departures from absolute priority are motivated 
by valuation uncertainty. We have also suggested that, while negotiations in 
large reorganizations are fact-dense and plans of reorganization are compli-
cated, the bargaining dynamics are similar from one case to the next. These 
dynamics regularly lead to negotiated plans of reorganization with basic fea-
tures consistent with the idea that valuation uncertainty dictates the con-
tours of such plans. These observations, together with the illustrations 
above, suggest there should be some discernable patterns to how valuation 
uncertainty is addressed in reorganization settlements.     
                                                                                                                       
sole owner of Firm. One time in five, Firm will be worth $375. In these cases, Lender will 
exercise its option and Bank will receive $275. Hence, the expected value of Bank’s share 
under the plan is worth (0.8 * 225) + (0.2 * 275) = 235. 
98 When Firm proves to be worth $375, the right to buy it for $275 is worth $100, and 
Lender believes this event will happen 80% of the time. 
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Settlements of valuation issues in large Chapter 11 cases take many 
forms. Often such settlements do not involve giving the junior creditors 
options that turn on the future value of the business. It is far simpler to al-
locate a fixed percentage of the common stock of the reorganized debtor to 
the junior class in recognition of the option value inherent in the junior 
class’s ability to force an appraisal of the enterprise. The amount of equity 
allocated to the junior class in such circumstances includes an “option 
value” component99—a component on account of the possibility that the 
court might adopt a higher-than-expected valuation if the issue were liti-
gated. The size of this component, or whether it is offered in settlement at 
all, will of course depend upon whether or not the senior class views there 
to be a realistic risk of the higher valuation being adopted by the court. 
Senior and junior investors may, however, find it difficult to arrive at a 
mutually satisfactory split of the reorganized debtor’s common stock, espe-
cially when the senior and junior investors have divergent beliefs about the 
underlying value of the business or the value the judge will place on it. Set-
tlements involving an outright division of the reorganized debtor’s com-
mon stock cannot navigate around the central difficulty of applying the ab-
solute priority rule. Fixing the allocation of common stock between the 
senior and junior classes in the plan of reorganization makes the plan con-
firmation date a “day of reckoning” in the sense that the finality of the allo-
cation extinguishes (or more precisely circumscribes) the option value of 
the junior class’s position. As we suggest above, in these circumstances it 
may well be easier to reach agreement if the day of reckoning can be post-
poned for a time through designing a distribution mechanism that to some 
extent perpetuates the optionality in the junior investor’s position. Securi-
ties can be designed with option features that allow time after the effective 
date of the plan of reorganization for the market to determine the value of 
the enterprise and the allocation of ultimate ownership rights in the busi-
ness.  
The reorganization plan might, for example, initially allocate virtually all 
of the common stock of the enterprise to the senior class based on a con-
servative valuation. It could then preserve for a time the right of the junior 
class to purchase some or all of the common stock, either directly from the 
senior class or, more typically, from the reorganized company. The price to 
be paid for the stock by the junior investor could be set by reference to an 
enterprise value sufficient to provide the senior investors a full recovery 
                                                 
99 The reference to an option value “component” is in recognition of the fact that the 
junior class may be entitled to some value even at the low end of the valuation range. The 
option value component is only that portion of the distributions that related to the possi-
bility that the judicial valuation could be higher than expected.  
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plus an appropriate risk adjusted return. A plan with this feature might of-
fer the junior class only a limited period of time to elect to purchase (for 
example, pursuant to a “rights offering”) or might offer a readily market-
able security, such as a warrant, that has a longer term.100 Settlements of this 
type can be structured in many ways, subject to the ability of the capital 
markets to accommodate the new securities. As long as the rights or war-
rants are freely assignable and a market for them eventually comes into be-
ing, these contingent rights do not force the junior investors to contribute 
new capital to realize the value of their rights.101 
 There are also alternatives that avoid the need for the junior class to 
supply new capital. For example, a plan can allocate the majority of the 
common stock to the junior class while the senior class retains a senior se-
                                                 
100 The shorter the amount of time in which the junior creditors have the ability to ex-
ercise these options, the more they become like Bebchuk options, which are rights that the 
junior investors have to buy out at senior investors at the time of the reorganization. See 
supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
101 The junior investors are better off being able to bargain for an ongoing option 
than they would be if they were required to buy out the senior investors to preserve the 
option value of their position. The appraisal model thus affords two distinct benefits to 
junior investors over the forced sale model. First, it provides junior investors with the abil-
ity to threaten an appraisal that potentially has greater valuation variance than the variance 
associated with real world outcomes (thereby increasing the option value of the junior in-
vestors’ position). Second, it permits junior investors to bargain to preserve the option 
value of their position without the need to put new capital at risk.  
The incremental option value associated with judicial appraisal stems not only from 
the potentially greater variance associated with expert appraisal than with real world out-
comes, but also from the likelihood that the variance associated with an appraisal by a 
judge who is not a financial expert and who is hearing testimony from experts hand-picked 
as advocates by opposing litigants will be greater than the variance associated with an ap-
praisal from an unbiased experts. This potential for increased variance is not associated 
with judicial bias, but rather with the judge’s lack of expertise and the likelihood that the 
testimony will exhibit systematic bias associated with the advocacy process both on the 
high side and on the low side. Critics of deviations from absolute priority can legitimately 
ask whether, apart even without manipulation of the process or bias on the part of the 
judge, it is appropriate for the system to afford to junior investors the value associated with 
this incremental appraisal variance. It is a cost our system imposes on senior investors as 
the price of permitting them the opportunity to reorganize rather than sell, and the ques-
tion is whether providing this opportunity is worth the cost. Assuming it is worth this cost, 
the next question is whether there are reforms that could help to minimize that cost. 
The combined effect of the ability to bargain for an ongoing option without being re-
quired to put further capital at risk and the incremental option value associated with the 
potentially greater variance of a judicial appraisal suggests that there is in the current sys-
tem a certain amount of leakage of value to junior investors that could be criticized as a 
genuine departure from absolute priority. 
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curity convertible into common stock. The senior investors can convert the 
security into common stock commencing at some future date if the market 
demonstrates that the senior investors are the true owners of the enterprise. 
In at least two recent cases (those of LaRoche Industries in 2001 and Con-
seco in 2003), such a “relative priority” security was issued to the senior 
investors, taking in each case the form of convertible preferred stock.102 
The preferred stock included a delayed conversion feature that permitted 
the debtor the opportunity to redeem the security before the date on which 
the conversion feature could be exercised.103 If the debtor could not ac-
complish the redemption, the conversion feature would become exercisable 
and the senior investors could effectuate a change of control of the com-
pany.  
A convertible preferred stock of this type has a number of attractive 
features. By converting senior debt to preferred stock, it reduces the 
debtor’s indebtedness to a sustainable level. The delayed conversion feature 
coupled with the redemption feature gives the new shareholders (the junior 
investors) time for the market to demonstrate that their asserted higher 
valuation can in fact be realized. If the higher values are attained, the secu-
rity can be redeemed and the junior class can retain their controlling stake 
in the common stock. From the perspective of the senior class, the security 
sets a deadline for the transfer of control to the senior class while preserv-
ing their senior position. An adequate dividend rate on the security, which 
can be “paid in kind” until the conversion date, can assure that if the secu-
rity is redeemed, the senior class is in fact paid in full.104 If properly de-
signed, the security can be marketable, permitting those senior investors 
who desire to exit before the conversion date to do so.105 
Return to the American Instruments hypothetical. The plan of reor-
ganization might take the following form. Both the banks and the bond-
                                                 
102 Conseco, Inc., supra note 5, at 149; In re LaRoche Industries, Inc., Debtors’ Second 
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, Cases No. 00-1859 (D. Del. Bankr., Mar. 29, 2001) 
[hereinafter Laroche, Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan], at 10-11. 
103 Laroche, Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan, supra note 102, at Exhibit C. 
104 In Conseco, for example, this dividend rate was 11% and was paid in kind until re-
demption or the conversion date, after which the coupon was payable in cash. Second 
Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at 35. 
105 In Conseco, price quotes were available for Conseco’s new convertible preferred 
stock shortly after it emerged from Chapter 11 on September 10,2003, and the stock could 
be sold at close to its par value. Conseco, Inc. Emerges From Chapter 11, INSURANCE NEWS-
CAST, Sept. 12, 2003, available at www.worksite.net/091203earn.htm#1; Daily Adjusted 
Prices for Conseco Inc. 12/15/03 to 12/31/03 & 1/15/04 to 1/30/04, DialogClassic 
Web, available at www.dialogclassic.com/COMMAND.HTML. 
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holders agree that the business that emerges from Chapter 11 should carry 
only $100 million in debt and that the banks will take all of it. The question 
becomes one of dividing the equity. The banks believe that the business is 
worth no more than $250 million and that they are therefore entitled to vir-
tually all of the equity of the reorganized business. The bondholders believe 
that the value of the business is significantly higher—as much as $375 mil-
lion—and that they are entitled to a majority of the equity of the reorgan-
ized business. 
A conventional settlement is not possible because of the disparity in the 
parties’ views of the value of the enterprise (and the likely outcome of any 
litigation over valuation) and the inability of the bondholders at the time of 
the reorganization to borrow enough to buy out the banks’ position. The 
parties can, however, find it in their mutual interest to agree on a plan of 
reorganization that puts off the day of reckoning. Putting off the day of 
reckoning expands the settlement range. The crucial feature of such a set-
tlement resides in the nature of the security the bondholders receive (rights 
that have value only if American Instruments proves to be worth more than 
$250 million). These rights are something that the bondholders value 
highly, given their belief that the business is worth substantially more than 
$250 million), and that the banks value hardly at all, given their belief that 
the business will prove not to be worth much more than $250 million. 
Under one such plan, virtually all of the common stock is issued to the 
bondholders. The banks receive two different securities. First, the banks 
receive new bank debt in the amount of $100 million. For the balance of 
their claim ($150 million), the banks receive convertible preferred stock 
with a par value of $150 million. Dividends accrue over time, but are not 
paid out. The company has the power to redeem the preferred stock at par 
plus accrued dividends at any time (at the reorganized company’s option). 
In two year’s time, however, the banks have the right to convert their pre-
ferred stock. The conversion formula is set in such a fashion to give the 
banks the ability to acquire most of the equity of the business in the event 
that the business turns out to be worth less than $250 million. In the event 
that the business turns out to be worth more materially more than $250 
million, the company will exercise its right to redeem the preferred stock. 
Because the robust economic condition of the restructured business will 
have become apparent by that time, the company should have little trouble 
raising the funds needed to redeem the stock even though that amount 
cannot be borrowed today. 
This bargain is a departure from absolute priority in that, if the business 
were sold today, the bondholders might realize little or nothing, while the 
banks might have been paid in full or nearly in full. For the bargain to be 
struck, the banks must feel it benefits them enough to offset the risk of 
having to wait to lock in their ownership of the reorganized company if, as 
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they believe, the business in fact proves to be worth less than $250 mil-
lion.106 The settlement eliminates for them the risk of an adverse determina-
tion on valuation and the cost of litigation over valuation issue. If the banks 
are confident that, during the waiting period, the business will at least retain 
its current value until the contingencies built into the bargain are resolved, 
they may well conclude it is worth striking the bargain to avoid a show-
down over value. This will be especially true if the banks can reduce their 
risk by monetizing the value of the preferred stock by selling it in the mar-
ket before the end of the waiting period. Because the reorganized company 
has only $100 million of debt, the preferred stock should have substantial 
market value—perhaps even approaching par.107 
The plan of reorganization that emerges appears to depart from the ab-
solute priority rule. The bondholders receive more than they would in the 
counterfactual world in which the banks could insist on an immediate day 
of reckoning by forcing a sale of the enterprise or basing a reorganization 
plan on a valuation at the median of the valuation range (based, for exam-
ple, upon the average of multiple independent and unbiased expert apprais-
als108).  
The world of Chapter 11 is a world in which junior investors enjoy an 
option that arises whenever the outcome of the valuation process is uncer-
                                                 
106 Under the absolute priority rule, senior creditors being asked to absorb equity risk 
would need to be given sufficient compensation when things go well to offset the risk that 
there will not be enough to pay them in full if things go badly.  
107 The preferred stock will have an appropriate “pay in kind” coupon that accrues 
during the “waiting period.” It will be redeemable at par plus accrued during the waiting 
period, and convertible into substantially all of the reorganized company’s common stock 
at the end of the waiting period. If the value of the enterprise turns out to be higher than 
the banks expect, the security should trade close to par based on its priority, its coupon 
and the high likelihood of eventual redemption. This is in fact what occurred in the Con-
seco case. The enterprise value proved to be far greater than the principal amount of the 
pre-reorganization senior debt, and the convertible preferred stock issued to the senior 
creditors traded close to par until it was redeemed at par plus accrued dividends approxi-
mately [2 years] after issuance. See Conseco, Inc., Conseco to Redeem All Issued and Outstanding 
Shares of Class A Senior Cumulative Convertible Exchangeable Preferred Stock, May 12, 2004 avail-
able at 
www.conseco.com/conseco/selfservice/about/cnews/news.jhtml?newsId=ins_20040512
_1&cat=cnews; Conseco Inc., 2004 Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (May 12, 2004). If the 
value of the enterprise proves to be at or below the amount of senior debt, the preferred 
stock should trade at a value based on the assumption it will not be redeemed but instead 
converted into common stock at the end of the waiting period. Its value would then be 
dictated by the expected value of such common stock at the end of the waiting period.  
108 For a discussion of the virtues of using multiple appraisers in bankruptcy valua-
tions, see Scharfman, supra note 80. 
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tain. This “option” results not from the lack of a commitment to the prin-
ciple of absolute priority, but from being in a world in which the value 
placed on the business by an unbiased judge may well be higher, and per-
haps substantially higher, than the business could be sold for in the market 
place. In our example, the banks believe American Instruments’ business is 
worth only $250 million, but they do not believe it could be sold for that 
amount today nor would they favor a sale today. They also believe that, ab-
sent a sale, the court’s valuation could be substantially higher than $250 mil-
lion. In these circumstances, they are better off postponing the day of reck-





As we have seen, in large business reorganization cases, outcomes that 
are commonly considered departures (or “deviations”) from absolute prior-
ity are often something else entirely. They can be rational, voluntary settle-
ments made in the shadow of the absolute priority rule when the outcome 
of the court’s appraisal of the business (and, indeed, the value of the busi-
ness itself) is uncertain. Where the business is not sold, Chapter 11 plan 
negotiations are heavily influenced by the parties’ different beliefs about the 
value of the business and of the likely outcome of and variance associated 
with the court’s valuation. The settlement negotiations that take place in the 
context of these uncertainties are like any other litigation settlement nego-
tiations in that they will truncate litigation only if a bargaining range exists. 
Both senior and junior investors must view themselves to be better off 
reaching a settlement than they would be moving forward with a valuation 
hearing and letting the Chapter 11 process run its natural course.  
That the junior investor often takes options, warrants, or other securi-
ties whose value is contingent on the future performance of the business is 
to be expected as well. When parties have different beliefs about the value 
of the business, such plans expand the bargaining range and make settle-
ments possible that might not have been otherwise. What appear to be de-
partures from absolute priority are merely the settlements we should expect 
in the shadow of a well-functioning system of adjudication. 
The phenomenon is not a new one. Consensual recapitalizations in the 
face of uncertain valuations raise the same issues today that they did in the 
era of equity receiverships. For the same reasons as today, in the equity re-
ceiverships of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, senior investors often 
agreed to forego an actual sale or a judicial valuation and allowed junior in-
vestors to participate who might well be out of the money if there were a 
day of reckoning and the value of the business was fixed. Two legal schol-
ars, James Bonbright and Milton Bergerman, highlighted this behavior in a 
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landmark 1928 paper in the Columbia Law Review.109 They observed that sen-
ior investors in equity receiverships often allowed junior investors to par-
ticipate in distributions despite the failure of senior investors to be paid in 
full. They rejected absolute priority and endorsed testing the fairness of the 
recapitalization plan against a standard of “relative priority” because that 
standard was more congruent with the investor behavior they observed.110  
Following the publication of Bonbright and Bergerman’s paper, the de-
bate over the proper legal standard for approval of a reorganization re-
mained heated until the Supreme Court unequivocally adopted the absolute 
priority rule over a decade later.111 Those who attacked relative priority saw 
no reason to grant “out of the money” junior investors participation in the 
reorganized enterprise, contingent or otherwise.112 Rather than seeing such 
plans as a sensible way to settle in a world of uncertain valuations, critics 
saw advantage-taking by insiders (who tended to hold junior interests) of 
outsiders (who tended to hold senior claims).113 Because of perceived (and 
sometimes actual) abuses by insiders, the critics were blind to the possibility 
that senior creditors with the contractual right to priority might sensibly 
agree to grant contingent rights of participation to junior investors in a 
world of valuation uncertainty.  
Modern bankruptcy academics who criticize “deviations” from absolute 
priority have been equally blind to the possibility that such departures 
might be attributable to something other than manipulation of the process 
or bias of the courts. They ignore the fact that any regime that relies on ap-
praisal as the default method of resolving reorganization entitlements must 
contend with appraisal variance as a necessary by-product. Such systems 
grants junior investors something of value to sell that senior investors 
sometimes want to buy—the right to insist upon a day of reckoning in 
which the judge collapses future uncertainties to a discrete value. This right 
commands a price in the marketplace. Moreover, a coin that senior inves-
tors value relatively little (some form of option that takes into account the 
                                                 
109 See generally Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 17. 
110 Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 17, at 130. 
111 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).  
112 See, e.g., Jerome N. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reor-
ganization, 19 VA. L. REV. 541, 541–42 (1933) 
113 See, e.g., William O. Douglas & Jerome Frank, Landlords’ Claims in Reorganizations, 42 
YALE L.J. 1003, 1012-13 (1933); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON 
THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNC-
TIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, Part I–VIII (1937–1940) 
(written under the direction of William O. Douglas).   
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low probability that the business will ever be worth much) is one that the 
junior investors may value peculiarly highly. 
From a perspective over seventy-five years distant from Bonbright and 
Bergerman’s original work, it appears that their work was closer to the mark 
than much that has been written since. Bonbright and Bergerman recog-
nized that the prevailing practice (one in which there was “relative” as op-
posed to “absolute” priority) did not necessarily reflect a substantive enti-
tlement that departed from absolute priority.114 Settlement behavior merely 
reflected pragmatic negotiated solutions when valuations were uncertain,115 
avoiding the risks and costs of a full-dress valuation of the business.116  
Bonbright and Bergerman felt the legal rule for approving such settlements 
should conform to the bargains actual investors seemed to want to strike in 
the real world.117   
The idea of absolute priority grew out of real estate foreclosure law 
contemplating an actual sale of the asset for cash. Respecting the right of a 
mortgagee to be paid first is easy when there is an actual sale that creates a 
pile of cash. It is not so easy when there is no cash sale and some other 
mechanism must be used to value an operating business. For this reason, 
Bonbright and Bergerman concluded absolute priority was “not well 
adapted to the corporate form of organization,”118 and that a rule of relative 
priority, consistent with observed settlement behavior, was more sensible as 
a response to the problems of the financially distressed corporation. If the 
fairness of a reorganization were measured by a relative priority benchmark, 
no single party could block a settlement by insisting on payment in full. In-
stead of the reorganization day becoming the day of reckoning (requiring an 
uncertain and costly valuation), the parties would be able, without unanim-
                                                 
114 Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 17, at 131-33. 
115 See, e.g., Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the 
Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 912 (1927) (“Mathematical exactness is not required 
and is not possible. Reasonable adjustments are encouraged. Every reorganization plan of 
necessity represents a compromise.”). 
116 See Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 17, at 161 (“[T]he adjustment of the claims 
of the various classes of securities on the basis of relative position rather than on the basis 
of a wiping out of equities effects an escape from the difficult, nay almost impossible, task 
of estimating in advance the probably values of the securities of the reorganized company 
in order to determine how much and what kind of securities must be offered to the senior 
bondholders to fully indemnify them for their investment in the old bonds.”). 
117 Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 17, at 165. 
118 See id.  
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ity, to implement a reorganization settlement that recognizes the option 
value the reorganization process sometimes affords the junior interests. 
Despite Bonbright and Bergerman’s expectations to the contrary, the 
absolute priority rule was adopted as the standard for approval of a busi-
ness reorganization (as the interpretive gloss on the “fair and equitable” 
standard carried forward in Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act).119 Its 
adoption precluded senior investors from buying out the option held by 
junior investors even when the vast majority of senior investors wanted to. 
Modern Chapter 11, in contrast, while embracing absolute priority un-
equivocally as the ultimate substantive rule, encourages consensual relative 
priority plans. One of the key reforms effected by enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in 1978 was to permit bargains to be struck by a statutory ma-
jority of senior investors waiving enforcement of the absolute priority 
rule.120 By providing an easier path to consensual relative priority plans 
against the backdrop of the absolute priority rule, the Bankruptcy Code 
achieved the very balance that Bonbright and Bergerman sought to achieve 
through a substantive standard of relative priority.  
Bonbright and Bergerman instinctually understood what it took almost 
50 years for Congress to recognize: a reorganization system based on sub-
jective valuation rather than monetization of the business in the market-
place often leaves senior investors worse off even if the ostensible objective 
of the valuation is to enforce absolute priority. Bonbright and Bergerman 
embraced relative priority as a substantive rule because the negotiations that 
now take place in Chapter 11 were more difficult in a world in which 
unanimous consent was required and a single senior creditor could insist on 
payment in full as a condition of allowing the entire plan to go forward. 
They merely failed to recognize that the real impediment to accomplishing 
their goal was not the legal standard, but rather the unanimity requirement 
that permitted holdouts to block reorganizations favored by the vast major-
ity of investors.  
Taken in this light, the debate about absolute versus relative priority 
should not exist at all. We live in a world in which the absolute priority rule 
is flourishing, but an important feature of such a world—and that one that 
over 75 years of scholarship has misunderstood—is that relative priority 
plans exist, they are the norm in such a world, and they are fully consistent 
with absolute priority as a substantive default rule where the bankruptcy 
                                                 
119 See Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 883-905 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976) (repealed 1978)). 
120 See Lawrence P. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
107, 108-09 (1979). 
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system offers a reorganization option that contemplates a judicial valuation 
as the means for enforcement of the rule. One may ask whether the impact 
of valuation uncertainty, inherent as it is in a system that relies on judicial 
valuation, is an unacceptable anomaly and whether some other procedure 
would be a better one. If, however, investors continue believe that reor-
ganization of a business sometimes affords them a better outcome than 
selling it, it is difficult to see any alternative to the appraisal model as long 
as we believe it impractical to require junior investors to buy out senior in-
vestors to preserve the option value of their own position. We can create 
better appraisal mechanisms perhaps, but departures from absolute priority 
will persist. Relative priority settlements are inevitable in every appraisal 
regime. 
The negotiated plans of reorganization that we see today in the case of 
large troubled businesses are by and large consistent with what we should 
expect to see in a world in which bankruptcy judges are unbiased experts 
who strictly respect bargained-for priority rights. What appear to be depar-
tures from this norm most often simply reflect the value of the option jun-
ior investors enjoy whenever the mechanism for establishing value involves 
a third-party appraisal. Critiques of Chapter 11 should begin by focusing 
not on whether departures from absolute priority are good or bad, but 
rather on creative mechanisms for implementing relative priority solutions 
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